|
| 1 | Robert Kagan, who believes the United States should seek a leadership role in international affairs, asserts that American economic dominance has been welcomed by much of the world because: |
 | A) | the United States has always made money for its partners. |
| B) | others had no choice in the matter. |
| C) | it demonstrated a lifestyle others wish to emulate. |
| D) | when America is doing well, it is able to afford to help others. |
|
| 2 | Stephen Walt, who does not believe the United States should seek a leadership role in international affairs, says that on the question of the durability of American primacy, the real question has always been whether or not: |
| A) | America would follow the same path as the British Empire. |
| B) | influence could be exerted in the absence of economic primacy. |
| C) | America should exert influence. |
| D) | what one might term the “American Era” was nearing its end. |
|
| 3 | Michael McFaul, who believes that promoting democracy abroad should be a top U.S. priority, states categorically that every foreign enemy of the United States has been: |
| A) | a monarchy. |
| B) | a dictatorship. |
| C) | socialist. |
| D) | Islamic. |
|
| 4 | Dimitri K. Simes, who does not believe that promoting democracy abroad should be a top U.S. priority, asserts that most of the world sees the United States as: |
| A) | a waning power. |
| B) | basically irrelevant. |
| C) | a disinterested benefactor. |
| D) | an imperial power. |
|
| 5 | President Barack Obama, who believes that a multilateral approach to international affairs is in the best interest of the United States, offers in his speech a quotation about world peace that says “it must be a peace which rests on the cooperative effort of the whole world,” a quotation from: |
| A) | Woodrow Wilson. |
| B) | Winston Churchill. |
| C) | Mahatma Gandhi. |
| D) | Franklin D. Roosevelt. |
|
| 6 | Robert J. Lieber, who does not believe that a multilateral approach to international affairs is in the best interest of the United States, asserts that America’s future is a matter of: |
| A) | will and willpower. |
| B) | continued economic recovery. |
| C) | asserting moral dominance. |
| D) | cooperation among nations. |
|
| 7 | Gordon Adams, who believes that U.S. defense spending should be reduced dramatically, states that in the long term, there has always been a link between strategy and: |
| A) | resources. |
| B) | tactics. |
| C) | leadership. |
| D) | goals. |
|
| 8 | Robert M. Gates, who does not believe that U.S. defense spending should be reduced dramatically, refers to a decade of “no questions asked” funding requests that followed: |
| A) | the end of the Cold War. |
| B) | the 9/11 terrorist attacks. |
| C) | World War II. |
| D) | the end of the Vietnam War. |
|
| 9 | Rajiv Shah, who believes that spending on foreign aid furthers U.S. national interests, admits that even though primary-school enrollment has increased by 15 percent among USAID’s top recipients, in some countries, 80 percent of schoolchildren: |
| A) | only attend school for three months of the year. |
| B) | still lack the most basic school supplies. |
| C) | cannot read a single word at the end of second grade. |
| D) | have no access to qualified teachers. |
|
| 10 | James M. Roberts, who does not believe that spending on foreign aid furthers U.S. national interests, urges Congress to reject future taxpayer-funded U.S. government assistance programs designed to achieve the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, but makes an exception for: |
| A) | educational programs. |
| B) | health care initiatives. |
| C) | former theaters of war, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. |
| D) | emergency and humanitarian assistance after natural disasters. |
|
| 11 | Paul D. Miller, who believes the United States should continue a strategy of state building in Afghanistan, states that the single greatest resource the United States now needs in Afghanistan is not more troops but more: |
| A) | time. |
| B) | money. |
| C) | international cooperation. |
| D) | education. |
|
| 12 | Joshua Rovner and Austin Long, who do not believe the United States should continue a strategy of state building in Afghanistan, think that state building is seen as: |
| A) | the natural next step after having toppled the Taliban. |
| B) | something only the United States can accomplish. |
| C) | necessary for the future of the Afghan people. |
| D) | the antidote to terrorist safe-havens. |
|
| 13 | Matthew Kroenig, who believes that the United States should use military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, outlines the forms of retaliation Iran might consider in response to a U.S. attack on its nuclear facilities, which would then provoke an escalation of hostilities; Kroenig dubs these particular forms of retaliation: |
| A) | excessive force. |
| B) | lines in the sand. |
| C) | aggressive signals. |
| D) | redlines. |
|
| 14 | Colin H. Kahl, who does not believe that the United States should use military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, compares attacking Iran to the preventive action taken by the United States against: |
| A) | North Korea. |
| B) | Iraq. |
| C) | Afghanistan. |
| D) | Libya. |
|
| 15 | John J. Mearsheimer, who believes that a rising China is a threat to U.S. national security, gives as evidence of the fear that China already inspires the signing of a “Joint Security Declaration” between: |
| A) | the United States and Australia. |
| B) | India and Japan. |
| C) | Russia and India. |
| D) | South Korea and Vietnam. |
|
| 16 | G. John Ikenberry, who does not believe that a rising China is a threat to U.S. national security, notes that China does not just face the United States, it faces: |
| A) | Russia. |
| B) | India. |
| C) | the United States and all its allies. |
| D) | a Western-centered system. |
|
| 17 | Daniel Kurtzer, who believes that the United States should play the leading role in revitalizing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, states that the recent decision by the Palestinian Authority to seek reconciliation with Hamas and UN membership reflects a lack of faith that the Obama Administration can or will put pressure on Israel to stop settlement and a belief that: |
| A) | the United Nations will throw its weight behind the establishment of a Palestinian state. |
| B) | serious negotiations with the Israeli government are not possible. |
| C) | Hamas and Hezbollah can help the Palestinians achieve a military victory. |
| D) | the two-state outcome is the most likely outcome of the peace process. |
|
| 18 | Salman Shaikh, who does not believe that the United States should play the leading role in revitalizing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, reports that Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu dismissed Palestinian demands for an end to Israeli settlement building while setting as a precondition for further peace talks: |
| A) | the presence of the United States as a mediator. |
| B) | an end to Palestinian demands for a separate Palestinian state. |
| C) | reparations from the Palestinians for Israeli citizens killed by air attacks. |
| D) | recognition by the Palestinians of Israel as a Jewish state. |
|
| 19 | Stephen D. Krasner, who believes that the United States should cut foreign aid to Pakistan, states that the one significant policy change by the United States since 2008 with respect to Pakistan has been: |
| A) | the retargeting of aid to civilians. |
| B) | greater assistance in helping Pakistan fight terrorism at home. |
| C) | increased UN involvement in mediating U.S.-Pakistani relations. |
| D) | the threat to withhold aid from Pakistan in order to gain its assistance in the war in Afghanistan. |
|
| 20 | Jeffrey Goldberg and Marc Ambinder, who do not believe the United States should cut foreign aid to Pakistan, quotes President Obama as saying that the single biggest threat to U.S. security is: |
| A) | destabilization in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. |
| B) | a terrorist attack similar to that made by al Qaeda on September 11, 2001. |
| C) | a worldwide economic depression. |
| D) | the possibility that a terrorist organization would obtain a nuclear weapon. |
|
| 21 | Daniel J. Ikenson and Scott Lincicome, who believe that free trade is good for the United States, dub the concept that “exports are good, imports are bad, and the trade account is a scoreboard” as: |
| A) | self-evident truth. |
| B) | the mercantilist fallacy. |
| C) | quid pro quo at work. |
| D) | uneven and unfair. |
|
| 22 | Michael Lind, who does not believe that free trade is good for the United States, dismisses as a myth the idea that the Great Depression was significantly worsened by: |
| A) | NAFTA. |
| B) | the Smoot-Hawley tariff legislation. |
| C) | the opening of new markets in Japan and Southeast Asia. |
| D) | ending U.S. reliance on the gold standard to back its currency. |
|
| 23 | Clifford Krauss and Eric Lipton, who believe that the United States should end its dependence on foreign oil, quote Bill White, a former deputy energy secretary in the Clinton Administration and former mayor of Houston, who said that energy independence has always been a race between depletion and: |
| A) | technologies to produce more and use energy more efficiently. |
| B) | secure domestic supplies of oil. |
| C) | development of alternative energy sources. |
| D) | the realization that the problem must be addressed. |
|
| 24 | Paul Roberts, who does not believe that the United States should eliminate its dependence on foreign oil, believes that the United States should instead focus on: |
| A) | alternative energies. |
| B) | U.S. supplies of domestic oil. |
| C) | regulating the price of foreign oil. |
| D) | energy security. |
|
| 25 | Julia Martinez Vivancos, who believes that the United States should join the International Criminal Court, defines the principle that the ICC is a final option only when domestic courts and procedures cannot deal with atrocities as the principle of: |
| A) | complementarity. |
| B) | exceptionalism. |
| C) | singularity. |
| D) | finality. |
|
| 26 | Brett D. Schaefer and Steven Groves, who do not believe that the United States should join the International Criminal Court, note that although President Clinton signed the Rome Statute, this signature was reversed by: |
| A) | President Obama. |
| B) | Congress. |
| C) | the U.S. Supreme Court. |
| D) | President George W. Bush. |
|
| 27 | Nikolas K. Gvosdev and Ray Takeyh, who believe that the United States should intervene militarily in the absence of a direct threat to U.S. national interests, characterize as a major turnaround in U.S. policy “Operation Odyssey Dawn,” a military action in: |
| A) | Iraq. |
| B) | Kuwait. |
| C) | Libya. |
| D) | Kosovo. |
|
| 28 | John J. Mearsheimer, who does not believe that that the United States should intervene militarily in the absence of a direct threat to U.S. national interests, states that in only one instance when the United States intervened in a country in the developing world since World War II did a stable democracy emerge; this was in: |
| A) | Afghanistan. |
| B) | Colombia. |
| C) | Nicaragua. |
| D) | Libya. |
|
| 29 | Ruth Greenspan Bell, who believes that U.S. diplomatic efforts are needed to create a binding international climate-change treaty, reports that in some countries, such as India, governments are being pushed into environmental compliance by: |
| A) | treaties. |
| B) | economic necessity. |
| C) | newspaper publicity. |
| D) | non-governmental organizations (NGOs). |
|
| 30 | Bjørn Lomborg, who does not believe that U.S. diplomatic efforts are needed to create a binding international climate-change treaty, characterizes as the “holy grail of climate negotiations”: |
| A) | a majority of the world’s nations as signing members. |
| B) | sufficient funding to ensure compliance. |
| C) | a legally binding treaty. |
| D) | the participation of the United States and China in negotiations. |
|
| 31 | James M. Lindsay, who believes that Congress is still relevant in U.S. foreign policy-making, states that the most popular vehicle for Congress to specify the substance of American foreign policy is the power to: |
| A) | declare war. |
| B) | regulate commerce with other nations. |
| C) | provide for the common defense. |
| D) | appropriate all government funds. |
|
| 32 | Norman J. Ornstein and Thomas E. Mann, who do not believe that Congress is still relevant in U.S. foreign policy-making, posits that the most logical explanation for why Congress abandoned oversight during the first decade of the twenty-first century is that the: |
| A) | two parties are so diametrically opposed. |
| B) | president’s popularity makes questioning his decisions
politically unwise. |
| C) | body lacks a strong institutional identity. |
| D) | issues of national security override other concerns. |
|
| 33 | Robert J. Delahunty, who believes that the president has too much power in decision-making about the use of American military power abroad, identified the basis of the Obama Administration’s argument justifying its actions in Libya as saying that the United States was not: |
| A) | in violation of the War Powers Resolution. |
| B) | acting unilaterally. |
| C) | acting without congressional approval. |
| D) | engaged in hostilities. |
|
| 34 | The Congressional Research Service, which does not believe the president has too much power in decision-making about the use of American military power abroad, gives all of the following as reasons of national interest for the U.S. actions in Libya except to: |
| A) | limit the spread of violence and instability in a region pivotal to our security interests. |
| B) | protect our economic interests in the region, specifically as a source of oil. |
| C) | prevent an imminent humanitarian catastrophe. |
| D) | show the people of the Middle East and North Africa that America stands with them at a time of momentous transition. |