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1 | | The hard determinist argues that (1) causal determinism is true and (2) causal determinism and free actions are incompatible, therefore |
| | A) | some free actions are uncaused. |
| | B) | hard determinism is false. |
| | C) | some actions free. |
| | D) | there are no free actions. |
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2 | | Modern science proves that |
| | A) | every event has a cause. |
| | B) | some events are uncaused. |
| | C) | all events are essentially random. |
| | D) | some random events are caused. |
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3 | | The view that free actions are uncaused is advocated by |
| | A) | Richard Taylor. |
| | B) | Thomas Hobbes. |
| | C) | William James. |
| | D) | John Locke. |
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4 | | The doctrine of causal determinism is vindicated by |
| | A) | reflective common sense. |
| | B) | philosophy. |
| | C) | science. |
| | D) | none of the above. |
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5 | | According to hard determinism, if there are no free actions, |
| | A) | some people can be held responsible for what they do. |
| | B) | no one can be held responsible for what he or she does. |
| | C) | indeterminism must be true. |
| | D) | only moral agents can be held responsible for what they do. |
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6 | | According to traditional compatibilism |
| | A) | free actions and causal indeterminism are compatible. |
| | B) | free actions and causal determinism are compatible. |
| | C) | causal determinism and libertarianism are compatible. |
| | D) | free actions and external restraint are compatible. |
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7 | | According to traditional compatibilism, a free action |
| | A) | must be caused by one's will. |
| | B) | must not be externally constrained. |
| | C) | must have a cause. |
| | D) | all of the above. |
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8 | | If your actions are caused by your will, and if they are not externally constrained, then |
| | A) | your actions can still fail to be free. |
| | B) | your actions are free. |
| | C) | your actions are both free and unfree. |
| | D) | your choices are up to you. |
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9 | | According to hierarchical compatibilism, a free action |
| | A) | is one performed in response to first-order desires. |
| | B) | is caused by second-order volitions that one decisively identified with. |
| | C) | is impossible unless one can do otherwise. |
| | D) | can be induced by an ingenious physiologist. |
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10 | | Self-conscious beings |
| | A) | are unaware of first-order desires. |
| | B) | can have desires about first-order desires. |
| | C) | cannot have both first-order and second-order desires. |
| | D) | are unaware of second-order desires. |
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11 | | According to libertarianism, |
| | A) | agent causation does not require substance dualism. |
| | B) | a rational choice need not involve an infinite regress of reasons or choices. |
| | C) | second-order volitions are caused by the agent. |
| | D) | all of the above. |
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12 | | From the fact that we can sometimes be deceived about whether we are acting freely, we can conclude that |
| | A) | we can never act freely. |
| | B) | we do not perform free actions but often believe that we do. |
| | C) | free will is an illusion. |
| | D) | none of the above. |
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13 | | According to libertarianism, an action is free |
| | A) | as long as it is caused by our will. |
| | B) | only if we have control over our will. |
| | C) | as long as our choices are second-order volitions. |
| | D) | as long as we believe that the action is free. |
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14 | | Agent-causation is |
| | A) | the causation that occurs when one event causes another. |
| | B) | the causation that occurs when events cause an agent to perform a certain action. |
| | C) | the causation that occurs when an agent believes that he or she is in control. |
| | D) | the causation that occurs when an agent causes an event. |
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15 | | According to Nozick, self-subsuming principles |
| | A) | are self-explanatory. |
| | B) | do not require other principles to support them. |
| | C) | show that our choices need be neither arbitrary nor irrational. |
| | D) | all of the above. |
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