Over a decade after the publication of the original theory, Berger (1987) admitted that Uncertainty Reduction Theory “contains some propositions of dubious validity” (p. 40). Other writers concur. Although URT has stimulated a great deal of discussion and research, it also has been criticized. Basically, the critics find fault in two areas of the theory: the assumptions and its validity, both of which affect the theory’s utility.

Utility

Some researchers believe that the major assumptions of the theory are flawed. Michael Sunnafrank (1986) argues that reducing uncertainty about the self and another in an initial encounter is not an individual’s primary concern. Instead, Sunnafrank argues, “a more primary goal is the maximization of relational outcomes” (p. 9). Sunnafrank calls for a reformulation of URT that takes into account the importance of predicted outcomes during initial interactions. This has come to be known as predicted outcome value (POV). Drawing on our chapter’s opening, Sunnafrank would contend that Malcolm will be more concerned with maximizing rewards in a potential relationship with Edie than in figuring out what she might do and why she is doing it. Actually, Sunnafrank suggests that URT might kick in after Malcolm decides what the predicted outcomes of talking with Edie will be.

Berger’s (1986) response to Sunnafrank is that outcomes cannot be predicted without knowledge and reduced uncertainty about oneself, one’s partner, and one’s relationship. It is Berger’s contention that uncertainty reduction is independent of as well as necessary to predicted outcome values. In fact, he believes that if one remains highly uncertain, there really are no predicted outcome values. Further, Berger responds to Sunnafrank’s critique by noting that the act of predicting an outcome serves as a means to reduce uncertainty. Thus, Berger concludes that Sunnafrank has simply expanded the scope of URT rather than offering an alternative to it.

The second area of criticism of URT has to do with its validity. Recall that even Berger (1987) has admitted some validity problems, yet he is not willing to give up on the theory. Some of his more skeptical colleagues, however, assert that given the tight logical structure of an axiomatic theory, if one building block is wrong, then much of the resulting theory is suspect. Kathy Kellermann and Rodney Reynolds (1990) point to Axiom 3, which suggests that high uncertainty causes high levels of information-seeking behavior, as problematic.

Their study of over a thousand students failed to find support for the third axiom. Instead, they found that “wanting knowledge rather than lacking knowledge is what promotes information-seeking in initial encounters with others” (p. 71 [emphasis added]). Kellermann and Reynolds point out that many times we may be uncertain about another but because we have no interest in the other, we are not motivated to reduce our uncertainties by information-seeking behaviors. People engage in communication, therefore, not to reduce uncertainty but because they care about the other, are interested in the other, or both. In a different vein, Dale Brashers (2001) also questions the validity of Axiom 3. He notes with reference to post-September 11 anxieties that sometimes more information results in a greater sense of uncertainty. Interestingly, however, Dell McKinney and William Donaghy (1993) found some empirical support for Axiom 3, so the debate on this issue undoubtedly will continue concerning URT’s usefulness.

Heurism, Parsimony, Logical Consistency, and Test of Time

Despite these shortcomings, Uncertainty Reduction Theory remains the only communication theory to specifically examine initial interactions. Further, reflecting on our criteria for theory evaluation from Chapter 3, this theory is, first, highly heuristic. For instance, URT has been integrated into research examining small groups (Booth-Butterfield, Booth-Butterfield, & Koester, 1988) as well as research in mass communication (Dimmick, Sikand, & Patterson, 1994) and computer-mediated communication (Walther & Burgoon, 1992). In addition, the theory is relatively simple in presentation-therefore passing the test of parsimony. The theorems Berger and Calabrese propose derive from the axioms, a logical progression in thinking, making the theory score high on the criterion of logical consistency. Further, the theory is still being utilized for studies today, thirty years after its inception. Thus, it stands the test of time.

Finally, URT, like all theoretical thinking, can be considered to be tentative in that the theorists originally claimed that “there are other relevant constructs which might be explicitly incorporated into the model” (Berger & Calabrese, 1975, p. 111). Obviously, the writers were qualifying their original assumptions and conclusions, which paved the way for others to apply the theory variously.

Uncertainty Reduction Theory has made a very important contribution to the field of communication, even as it has generated controversy and theoretical disputes. Further, although this theory may be somewhat linear in nature (recall our discussion on communication models in Chapter 1), it has provoked a great deal of commentary and research, and it has placed communication in a central position. It marks the beginning of communication researchers focusing on their own discipline for theoretical explanations rather than borrowing theories from other disciplines. Further, it provides an ongoing dialogue as researchers continue to debate the validity of uncertainty reduction as a primary issue in relationship development.