 |
| 1 | |
Present-aim rationality |
| | A) | insists that one's aims fit the prevailing social norms. |
| | B) | ignores possible motives like altruism, desire for justice and fidelity to principle. |
| | C) | takes aims as given exogenously and therefore these aims are not subject to critique. |
| | D) | eliminates unusual or bizarre behavior from economic consideration. |
|
|
|
| 2 | |
If Franny's utility function is U = f(Franny's income and Zooey's income), then |
| | A) | the rational self-interest assumption of behavior will not predict Franny's behavior in many cases. |
| | B) | altruistic behavior can be predicted. |
| | C) | present-aim rationality is the only feasible way to model her behavior. |
| | D) | all of the above are true. |
| | E) | none of the above are true. |
|
|
|
| 3 | |
Biologists have helped economists see that |
| | A) | self preservation, narrowly defined, is the only motive that preserves a species. |
| | B) | organism's tastes are arbitrarily given rather than formed in a contest of adaptation. |
| | C) | preferences depend on historical and developmental circumstances. |
| | D) | all organisms have the same basic strategic preferences. |
|
|
|
| 4 | |
The following four questions relate to information below.
Pick-up basketball games involve two types of players, individualist ball hogs (I) and team playmakers (T). If individualists are on the same team, they average 10 points each. If team playmakers get together, they work for the open shot and average 25 points each. If Is and Ts play together the Is average 30 points each and the Ts average zero points. Players with the lowest personal scoring averages drop out of the player pool first. If teams are formed randomly for each game, what will be the eventual equilibrium proportion of Is and Ts? |
| | A) | 100% Is and 0% Ts |
| | B) | 75% Is and 25% Ts |
| | C) | 50% Is and 50% Ts. |
| | D) | 25% Is and 75% Ts |
|
|
|
| 5 | |
If players are able to freely distinguish between types of players and then form teams by preference, what will the population of players eventually become? |
| | A) | 100% Is and 0% Ts |
| | B) | 75% Is and 25% Ts |
| | C) | 50% Is and 50% Ts. |
| | D) | 25% Is and 75% Ts |
| | E) | 0% Is and 100% Ts |
|
|
|
| 6 | |
If players must pay for information about other players and the cost is equal to 10 points, then the equilibrium population will be |
| | A) | 0% Ts, and 100% Is |
| | B) | 100% Ts and 0% Is |
| | C) | 25% Ts and 75% Is |
| | D) | 75% Ts and 25% Is |
| | E) | 60% Ts and 40% Is |
|
|
|
| 7 | |
The moral of the story presented in the three questions above is that |
| | A) | players who pretend to be team players but are really individualists will get further ahead in the long run. |
| | B) | outcomes are the same no matter what the basic nature of people. |
| | C) | self centered individualists will always be better off than team players. |
| | D) | there is a viable niche for groups with significantly different but sincerely held preferences. |
|
|
|
| 8 | |
The prisoners dilemma problem would result in the prisoners going free if |
| | A) | the prisoners were allowed to discuss their situation before being separately questioned. |
| | B) | the prisoners would simply tell the truth. |
| | C) | the prisoners could develop an effective foolproof commitment device. |
| | D) | each prisoner would follow their self-interest assuming their partner would confess. |
|
|
|
| 9 | |
Irrational behavior or the credible threat of it |
| | A) | is bound to detract from an optimal outcome for an individual. |
| | B) | increases the possibility of credible commitments among people. |
| | C) | can reduce the need to continue the practice of such irrational behavior. |
| | D) | is what makes the prisoners dilemma outcome plausible. |
|
|
|
| 10 | |
The commitment model's functional view of preferences |
| | A) | suggests that the economists repertoire of tastes be expanded beyond the simple egoistic tastes. |
| | B) | views tastes as means rather than ends. |
| | C) | helps constrain the open ended nature of present aim rationality. |
| | D) | does all of the above. |
|
|
|
| 11 | |
The text case of Zooey and Franny illustrates that |
| | A) | preferences are interdependent in that someone may gain utility by seeing another's welfare increase. |
| | B) | present aim rationality and the standard rational choice analysis are incompatible. |
| | C) | altruism is irrational. |
| | D) | all of the above are true. |
| | E) | none of the above are true. |
|
|
|
| 12 | |
In the parable of the hawks and the doves, which statement is true? |
| | A) | The hawk's share of the population grows more rapidly when they are few in number. |
| | B) | Doves learn over time to be more aggressive so they survive by beating the hawks at their own game. |
| | C) | The entire society would be worse off if the hawks all adopted dovish behavior. |
| | D) | From the hawks point of view all doves should be eliminated and from the doves point of view, all hawks should be eliminated. |
| | E) | None of the above is true. |
|
|
|
| 13 | |
In most cases where cooperation would result in higher payoffs than competing behavior, cooperation fails as a social coordinating principle because |
| | A) | competing behavior pays off if only a few engage in it while everyone else is cooperating. |
| | B) | the trust required to have everyone cooperate is difficult to generate. |
| | C) | there are very few commitment devices that are foolproof. |
| | D) | all of the above help explain why competing behavior dominates economic behavior. |
| | E) | none of the above explain why cooperation fails as a social coordinating mechanism. |
|
|
|
| 14 | |
In the ultimate bargaining game described in your text, |
| | A) | the receiver accepts only one penny of the money because she operates from the assumption that more is better than less. |
| | B) | The receiver accepts none of the money in order to punish the allocator. |
| | C) | The receiver is willing to sacrifice some measure of fairness in order to get some money, but will not accept as small an amount as rational choice would predict. |
| | D) | The allocator will keep only one penny because he still will be better off than he was before the game. |
|
|
|
| 15 | |
This chapter argues that |
| | A) | present aim analysis assumes people have the same preferences. |
| | B) | people's tastes must differ because we are created as different individuals. |
| | C) | biology uses the rational choice model successfully in its modeling work. |
| | D) | people's tastes must differ because uniform tastes would expose a population to invasion by groups with competing strategies. |
|
|
|
| 16 | |
One assertion of this chapter is that |
| | A) | people are unable to hide their true preferences |
| | B) | people are skilled at disguising their feelings so that only their words matter. |
| | C) | egoistic tendencies invariably win out against altruistic ones. |
| | D) | preferences that appear nonegoistic are nothing more than disguised egoism. |
|
|
|
| 17 | |
Noneqoistic motivations will payoff for people if |
| | A) | they are able to tell people about their motivations. |
| | B) | they hold the motivations sincerely and are good judges of the character of others. |
| | C) | they can keep them secret and practice them subtlety. |
| | D) | they are willing to cheat on agreements at opportune times. |
|
|
|
| 18 | |
This chapter challenges the prevailing wisdom in NeoClassical economic modeling that |
| | A) | people's preferences do not change since only income and prices change. |
| | B) | survival depends on one's ability to effectively pursue self-interests. |
| | C) | emotions, commitments, and values do not significantly effect behavior. |
| | D) | all of the above are true. |
|
|
|
| 19 | |
According to your text |
| | A) | people can fake positions well enough to get ahead in life as frauds. |
| | B) | people are willing to pay money in order to enforce their concept of fairness. |
| | C) | voting participation rates will likely continue to decline in the democratic world. |
| | D) | material gain is an inappropriate motive for morality. |
|
|
.