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UNIT 1 The United States and the World: Strategic Choices

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- 1. From Hope to Audacity: Appraising Obama's Foreign Policy,** Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2010
The author, President Carter's national security advisor, **assesses Obama's foreign policy from two directions: its goals and its decision making system.** Obama is credited with reconnecting the United States with the world, although to date this has generated more by way of expectations than concrete breakthroughs. He concludes by identifying three systemic weaknesses to constructing a viable foreign policy and calls for Obama to be fully involved in the decision making process. 2
- 2. The World Still Needs a Leader,** Leslie H. Gelb, *Current History*, November 2009
The key issue facing the United States is: how should it think about and use its power to either preempt problems or help solve them? To Gelb, **the basis of the United States' real leverage in world politics is that it is the only world leader.** Other states know they cannot solve their problems without U.S. leadership and power. 8
- 3. Hegemony on the Cheap: Liberal Internationalism from Wilson to Bush,** Colin Dueck, *World Policy Journal*, Winter 2003/2004
The problems with Bush's foreign policy cannot be fixed by replacing unilateralism with multilateralism. The problems lie in the fact that the **liberal assumptions** on which it is based **encourage ambitious foreign policy goals, pursued by insufficient means** and resources. This situation is not unique to Bush but dates back to Wilson. 11
- 4. The Eagle Has Crash Landed,** Immanuel Wallerstein, *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2002
The United States has become the powerless superpower according to Wallerstein. The same economic, political, and military factors that gave rise to American hegemony are now leading to its inevitable decline. The key question today is, 'Can the United States devise a way to descend gracefully, or will it crash land in a rapid and dangerous fall?' 17
- 5. Pillars of the Next American Century,** James Kurth, *The American Interest*, November/December 2009
Kurth argues that the United States remains the world's most prominent power. At the same time, foreign policy success demands that the **United States must renovate or reinvent the pillars of power that propelled it to the statues of a global power.** They involve both hard (military) and soft (ideological) power. The essential power remains economic power. 22
- 6. Grand Strategy for a Divided America,** Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2007
The United States must strike a balance between its goals and its resources. Only then will it have **a politically solvent strategy that recognizes deep partisan differences;** which, if unattended, threaten to lead to an erratic and incoherent foreign policy. 29

The concepts in bold italics are developed in the article. For further expansion, please refer to the Topic Guide.

7. **Enemies into Friends: How the United States Can Court Its Adversaries**, Charles A. Kupchan, *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2010
Long standing rivals are turned into friends through a process of mutual accommodation and not coercive intimidation. For the Obama administration to succeed in its efforts at opening lines of communication, Kupchan argues two points must be kept in mind. First, the United States needs to obtain sustained cooperation and not isolated concessions. Second, it is best to proceed on secondary issues and not primary ones.

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UNIT 2

The United States and the World: Regional and Bilateral Relations

Unit Overview

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Part A. Russia

8. **Will Moscow Help with Trouble Spots?**, Yury E. Fedorov, *Current History*, October 2009

According to the author, *Russia is not particularly interested in helping the United States in resolving international problems* such as Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, defeating terrorism in Afghanistan, reaching a nuclear arms control agreement, or solving the Arab-Israeli problem. It is content to play a parasitic role in these issues and keep U.S. attention away from Russia.

42

9. **Russia and the West: Mutually Assured Distrust**, Marshall I. Goldman, *Current History*, October 2007

The West has become critical of the movement away from democracy and the free market reforms under Putin. Most Russians see it differently. They see these steps as necessary corrections to the excesses of Yeltsin's reforms. This essay examines these different perceptions and the implications they have for U.S. foreign policy.

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Part B. Asia

10. **Emerging Strategic Dilemmas in U.S.-Chinese Relations**, Joshua Pollack, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July/August 2009

No longer is arms control strictly a matter of U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations. *The United States must formulate a strategic weapons and military policy toward China.* A combination of U.S. distraction from the problem of China's military capabilities and general Chinese aloofness to the U.S. has increased the risks of accidental encounters and deepened suspicions as to each others' motives.

52

11. **China's Challenge to U.S. Hegemony**, Christopher Layne, *Current History*, January 2008

American hegemony is drawing to a close. Historically, the emerging challenge has been geopolitically destabilizing, and there is little reason to expect China to be an exception. *A future U.S.-China conflict is not assured and rests more on American actions than on Chinese decisions.*

58

12. **Let's Make a Deal**, Leon V. Sigal, *The American Interest*, January/February 2010

The primary danger of an uncontrolled North Korean nuclear program is that it may undermine the central pillars of U.S. foreign policy toward Asia: its relations with China, Japan and South Korea. Sigal calls for *a new negotiating strategy based on the idea of sustained engagement* that reduces North Korea's leverage in the region.

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Part C. The South

13. **Requiem for the Monroe Doctrine**, Daniel P. Erikson, *Current History*, February 2008
The historical realities that gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine have fundamentally changed, but the United States has been slow to adjust to the reality of globalization that is reaching into the Western Hemisphere. ***The United States must resist any temptation to revive the Monroe Doctrine.*** 66
14. **Mirror-Imaging the Mullahs: Our Islamic Interlocutors**, Reuel Marc Gerecht, *World Affairs Journals*, Winter 2008
Foreign policy experts must place questions of religion at the center of their political analyses of Iraq and Iran and stop assuming that elites in the Middle East think like them. If they did, then they would see that pro-American secular and autocratic political cultures in the region are dying. 72
15. **After Iran Gets the Bomb: Containment and Its Complications**, James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh, *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2010
The authors start from the premise that Iran will obtain a nuclear weapon and ask the question: how does the U.S. respond? They conclude that ***containing Iran will not be easy nor will it duplicate the Cold War containment experience.*** Containment is held to be possible because Iran's foreign policy combines revolutionary ideals and practical national interests. Three key areas of deterrence are identified. 76
16. **U.S. Africa Command: A New Strategic Paradigm?**, Sean McFate, *Military Review*, January/February 2008
In February 2007, the United States established its newest unified combat command—the Africa Command. The author examines why AFRICOM was created, how it is viewed in Africa, and how it can help secure Africa. He argues that ***to succeed, AFRICOM must link questions of military security with furthering economic development.*** 83
17. **Bottom-Up Nation Building**, Amitai Etzioni, *Policy Review*, December 2009 and January 2010
The United States' leverage in nation building in failing states is smaller than it appears to many U.S. officials. Accordingly, ***rather than proceed from designs, the author argues the U.S. should focus on trends on the ground.*** This would direct our attention away from national level initiatives to initiatives that build on tribes and clans and have the U.S. deal with natural leaders rather than elected ones. 92




UNIT 3 The Domestic Side of American Foreign Policy

- Unit Overview 98
18. **The War We Deserve**, Alasdair Roberts, *Foreign Policy*, November/December 2007
Blame for the Iraq War cannot be placed on neocons, President Bush, or the military. ***Responsibility for the Iraq War lies primarily with the American public***, who ask more and more of government but sacrifice less and less. Under such conditions, a global war against terrorism cannot be fought. 100
19. **The Evangelical Roots of US Africa Policy**, Asteris Huliaras, *Survival*, December 2008–January 2009
Evangelical Christians have come to play a significant role in the making of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa and other developing countries. This article examines the factors that have led to their increased activism and the issues they are concerned with. Special attention is given to their influence in the Bush administration. 104

20. **Waiting Games: The Politics of US Immigration Reform**, Susan F. Martin, *Current History*, April 2009
Immigration reform with Mexico is in a state of gridlock with little prospect existing for the passage of new legislation. This essay reviews *the history of efforts to reform U.S. immigration policy and the four different political coalitions that have formed around it*. The essay concludes with a congressional strategy for addressing the problem.

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UNIT 4

The Institutional Context of American Foreign Policy

Unit Overview

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Part A. The Presidency

21. **The Carter Syndrome**, Walter Russell Mead, *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2010

Presidential comparisons are commonplace. The author examines recent presidents and cites parallels in the content of their foreign policies to the ideas of four prominent American leaders: Alexander Hamilton, Woodrow Wilson, Thomas Jefferson, and Andrew Jackson. ***President Obama, Mead notes, is a Jeffersonian who may face the same fate as an earlier Jeffersonian, President Jimmy Carter.***

121

22. **National War Powers Commission Report**, *Miller Center of Public Affairs*, February 2007

National War Powers Commission Report. Established in 2007, this bipartisan commission examined the 1973 War Powers Resolution and found it to be impractical and ineffective. No president has ever filed a report triggering its provisions. The Commission made recommendations for a new War Powers Consultation Act whose key features are presented in this excerpt.

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Part B. The Bureaucracy

23. **The Homeland Security Hash**, Paul C. Light, *The Wilson Quarterly*, Spring 2007

The Department of Homeland Security has done little to make the United States more secure and is widely considered to be one of the most troubled bureaucracies in the government. This essay examines its establishment and how this condition came about, and makes suggestions for improving its performance.

130

24. **Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations**, Richard H. Kohn, *World Affairs Journals*, Winter 2008

Improving civil-military relations will be one of the major tasks facing the next president. Four areas stand out as in need of attention: ending the Iraq War, the need to create a 21st century military establishment, unsustainable military budgets, and social issues such as gays in the military.

135

25. **Lost for Words: The Intelligence Community's Struggles to Find Its Voice**, Josh Kerbel, *Parameters*, Summer 2008

The intelligence community is in the midst of analytic identity crisis. It struggles with the question of whether intelligence is more of an art or a science. The author suggests a better approach is to ***model intelligence analysis on the field of medicine*** and think of intelligence analysis in terms of a medical diagnosis.

140

26. **Arrested Development: Making Foreign Aid a More Effective Tool**, J. Brian Atwood, M. Peter McPherson, and Andrew Natsios, *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2008
All three authors are past administrators of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). They argue ***the problems with current U.S. development efforts cannot be fixed without a major organizational reform.*** They review past reorganization efforts and highlight the advantages and disadvantages of the two major options currently under discussion. 146

Part C. Congress

27. **When Congress Stops Wars: Partisan Politics and Presidential Power**, William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2007
Politics does not stop at the water's edge. ***The political composition of Congress has been the deciding factor in determining whether Congress will support or oppose presidential calls for war.*** The media is a potentially important ally for Congress in challenging presidential war powers. 150



UNIT 5
Foreign Policy Problems and the Policy Making Process

Unit Overview

28. **Law, Liberty and War: Originalist Sin**, Anne-Marie Slaughter and Jeremy Rabkin, *The American Interest*, Summer 2006
The Global War on Terrorism and its offshoot, the Iraq War, has sparked a major debate over the constitutional balance of power between Congress and the presidency and the protection of American civil liberties. Slaughter and Rabkin present contrasting interpretations of these and other issues that are central to the conduct of American foreign policy in the post-9/11 era. 154

29. **Neo-Conservatives, Liberal Hawks, and the War on Terror: Lessons from the Cold War**, Anatol Lieven and John C. Hulsman, *World Policy Journal*, Fall 2006
Using the Cold War as the starting point for its analysis, ***this essay is critical of both neo-conservatives and liberal hawks for holding utopian visions of the goals of American foreign policy and for the over-ambitious ideas on how to use American power.*** It calls for a return to pragmatic centrism. 157

30. **Securing the Information Highway: How to Enhance the United States' Electronic Defenses**, Wesley K. Clark and Peter L. Levin, *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2009
Cyber attacks are not an abstract future threat. They are already in use. The authors are concerned that the threat is underappreciated by U.S. policy makers and that little is being done to protect U.S. military, civilian, or commercial electronic attacks. To illustrate the potency of cyberthreats and how they might be met, the authors compare them to the challenges posed by the spread of dangerous biological diseases. 163



UNIT 6
U.S. International Economic Strategy

Unit Overview

31. **America's Sticky Power**, Walter Russell Mead, as seen in *Foreign Policy*, March/April 2004
America's military power coerces others to go along with it. America's soft power converts others to its cause. Mead argues that too long overlooked is America's ***economic power. It is "sticky," attracting others to the United States and then entrapping them.*** Sticky power is perfectly suited for stabilizing Iraq and managing relations with Russia and China. 169

The concepts in bold italics are developed in the article. For further expansion, please refer to the Topic Guide.

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32. **The New Axis of Oil**, Flynt Leverett and Pierre Noël, *The National Interest*, Summer 2006
The authors argue that structural shifts in the world's energy markets are creating the greatest challenge to American hegemony since the end of the Cold War. What has emerged is **a new axis of oil, which has at its center a geopolitical partnership between Russia and China.** 180
33. **The Coming Financial Pandemic**, Nouriel Roubini, *Foreign Policy*, March/April 2008
Global interdependence connects countries in good times and bad. Accordingly, **the U.S. financial crisis is like a disease that will infect other countries before it runs its course.** Prime areas to be affected are trade, the value of the dollar, and commodity prices. 185
34. **Can Sanctions Stop Proliferation?**, Dingli Shen, *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 2008
This essay explores **the conditions under which economic sanctions can succeed.** When applied to Iran, the author concludes that the conditions have not been met and that punishing Iran was a self contradicting mission. In the case of North Korea, it is argued that without external pressure it would not have voluntarily disabled its nuclear weapons capability, yet ultimate success is far from being realized. 188



UNIT 7 U.S. Military Strategy

Unit Overview 194

Part A. The Use of Force

35. **The New Rules of War**, John Arquilla, *Foreign Policy*, March/April 2010
The United States is criticized for failing to adapt its military strategy to the new and evolving nature of warfare. It continues to use technology to implement a doctrine of overwhelming force. The author presents **three new rules of warfare in an age of "netwar."** 196
36. **Space Wars: Coming to the Sky Near You?**, Theresa Hitchens, *Scientific American*, March 2008
This essay chronicles the opening moves in what may become **a new arms race in outer space.** The key states involved in this competition include the U.S., China, Russia, India, and Pakistan. The strategic cases for and against placing weapons in outer space are reviewed, as well as the financial and technological hurdles to doing so. 202
37. **Preemption Paradox**, Bennett Ramberg, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July/August 2006
Reviewing the historical record over preemptory military strikes dating back to World War II, the author finds that **preemptive military strikes only buy time.** As a strategy, preemption holds profound political risks, presents significant logistical and military problems, and ultimately is not capable of stopping the pursuit of nuclear weapons. 209
38. **New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency**, Steven Metz, *Parameters*, Winter 2007/2008
In the decade before 9/11, defense experts treated insurgencies as a relic of the Cold War, but **today's insurgencies are different from those of the past.** They are more like competitive markets than traditional wars, and this change is not yet sufficiently recognized. 215

Part B. Arms Control

- 39. Nuclear Disorder: Surveying Atomic Threats**, Graham Allison, *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2010

This essay suggests that ***the nuclear order today is as fragile as the international financial order was in 2008***. It identifies seven story lines which individually and collectively are undermining the nuclear order. At the same time, promising counter trends exist. Their existence suggests the possibility of bending these trends so that the non-proliferation regime holds its ground.

221

- 40. Nuclear Abolition: A Reverie**, Fred C. Iklé, *The National Interest*, September/October 2009

The author argues that creating a nuclear free world requires creating an international organization so powerful that it could implement and enforce a policy of zero nuclear weapons. He finds this a cause that deserves serious effort, but is not likely to be realized soon. Instead, Iklé ***calls for preserving the tradition of the nonuse of nuclear weapons***.

226

- 41. Low-cost Nuclear Arms Races**, Dan Lindley and Kevin Clemency, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March/April 2009

During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union spent hundreds of billions of dollars on building new nuclear weapons. This essay demonstrates that ***today a nuclear arms race would cost far less***, and money would not be a barrier to joining one. The major obstacles will be obtaining the fissile materials needed to build a bomb, and the political will to do so.

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UNIT 8

The Iraq War, Afghanistan, and Beyond

Unit Overview

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- 42. Lifting the Veil: Understanding the Roots of Islamic Militancy**, Henry Munson, *Harvard International Review*, Winter 2004

Feelings of impotence, rage, and humiliation pervade the Islamic world today. The author presents findings from recent public opinion polls taken in the Middle East. He concludes that ***defeating terrorism requires diluting the rage that fuels it***.

235

- 43. How We'll Know When We've Won: A Definition of Success in Iraq**, Frederick W. Kagan, *The Weekly Standard*, May 5, 2008

Written prior to the 2008 presidential election, at a time when the United States was debating how to move forward in the Iraq War, Kagan offers ***four measures of progress and five definitions of success for evaluating U.S. policy in Iraq***. These measures are equally applicable to the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan which is now underway.

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- 44. Is It Worth It?: The Difficult Case for War in Afghanistan**, Stephen Biddle, *The American Interest*, July/August 2009

Defining the Afghanistan War as Obama's gamble, the author presents an examination of the stakes involved, the costs of the war, and the likelihood of success. He asserts that ***the war in Afghanistan is costly, risky, and worth waging, but only barely so***. The stakes are indirect for the United States, but once committed to it, failure could have grave consequences.

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- 45. Afghanistan: Graveyard of Good Intent**, Michael Daxner, *World Policy Journal*, Summer 2009

The author identifies what is, in his mind, a fundamental flaw in U.S. policy in Afghanistan. It is an over-identification with U.S. security goals in the conflict and a lack of attention to the needs of the Afghan people. Part of a culture of intervention, ***this security-first approach robs Afghans of respect, and will cause the U.S. to lose the peace even if it wins the war***.

46. Cracks in the Jihad, Thomas Rid, *Wilson Quarterly*, Winter 2010

This essay surveys ***the changing nature of al Qaeda as a threat to the United States***. Rid argues that it is no longer a collective political actor and that visible divides exist between local and global jihadists. These changes have important consequences for U.S. policy, most notably whether the concept of a war on terrorism is still relevant.

255

47. Exit Lessons, David M. Edelstein, *Wilson Quarterly*, Autumn 2009

The author observes that for all of the talk of exit strategies from conflicts the United States has grown tired of, there has been little attention given to comparing and assessing various options. ***After reviewing both successful and failed exits, Edelstein presents five lessons on getting out.*** His ultimate conclusion is that, short of victory, there is no good exit strategy.

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