


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UNIT 1 The International System and Changing World Order of the Twenty-First Century

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- 1. The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance?**, Richard N. Haass, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2008
The principal characteristic of the twenty-first-century international system is “nonpolarity: a world dominated not by one, two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power. This represents a tectonic shift from the past.” 3
- 2. America’s Edge: Power in the Networked Century**, Anne-Marie Slaughter, *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2009
War, terrorists, and diplomacy are all networked responses to world crises. In the 21st world the measure of power is connectedness. In the network world that is evolving above the nation-state, the United States has clear and sustainable edge as the state with the most connections. The U.S. advantage is rooted in demography, geography, and culture. 7
- 3. Europe, the Second Superpower**, Andrew Moravcsik, *Current History*, March 2010
The United States and Europe will remain the only two global superpowers for the foreseeable future as they are the only nation-states able to “project a full spectrum of ‘smart power’ internationally.” Recent prognoses of European decline are misguided because they overlook the fact that Europe is the only region in the world besides the United States that projects intercontinental military power. Europe also poses a range of effective civilian instruments for projecting international influence that is unmatched by any country, even the United States. These tools include European Union enlargement, neighborhood policy, trade, foreign aid that exceeds that provided by the United States, support for multilateral institutions and international law, and European values. 14
- 4. Is Beijing Ready for Global Leadership?**, Evan S. Medeiros, *Current History*, September 2009
“China has become a truly global actor. There are few global problems for which Beijing is not a necessary part of the solution. . . .” However, for China there are **also limits** . . . Chinese policy makers regularly point out that their **foreign policy serves domestic goals of reform and development**, and the country is reluctant to take on too many responsibilities. 20
- 5. The Elephant in the Room**, Barbara Crossette, *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2010
“For all its business acumen and the extraordinary creativity unleashed in the service of growth, today’s India is an international adolescent, a country of outsize ambition but anemic influence. On crucial matters of global concern, from climate change to multilateral trade, India all too often just says no.” 26

The concepts in bold italics are developed in the article. For further expansion, please refer to the Topic Guide.



UNIT 2

Managing Interstate Conflicts and the Proliferation of Weapons

Unit Overview

28

Part A. Alliances, Balance of Power, and the Use of Force

6. **Europe and Russia: Up from the Abyss?**, Andrew C. Kuchins, *Current History*, March 2009

While *Russian-European political relations are now as contentious as anytime since the collapse of the Soviet Union, economic integration between Russia and European Union continues to deepen and widen*. This new dynamic is largely due to economic constraints on the Russian economy caused by a downturn in the growth of the Russian economy and the global slowdown.

31

7. **In the Koreas, Five Possible Ways to War**, David E. Sanger, *New York Times*, May 28, 2010

President **Obama** wants to stop the old cycle of inducements, watered-down sanctions, and crises between **North and South Korea but a new policy to change the North's behavior could backfire**. The article *summarizes five situations in which "good sense might not prevail"*: an incident at sea, shelling the DMZ, a power struggle or coup, an internal collapse; or a nuclear provocation. But the "biggest worry is that **North Korea could decide that teaching others how to build nuclear weapons** would be the fastest, stealthiest way to defy a new American President who has declared that stopping proliferation is Job No. 1."

33

Part B. Proliferation of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Technology

8. **Obama's Nuclear Policy: Limited Change**, Daniel Mockli, CSS Analysis in Security Policy, *Center for Security Studies (CSS)*, No. 74, May 2010

The Obama Administration is *changing U.S. nuclear policies with a new Nuclear Posture Review, the New START Treaty, and the Nuclear Security Summit* held in Washington, DC. *President Obama has called for complete nuclear disarmament*, but "domestic factors, alliance policy and strategic considerations limit the scope for major changes in U.S. policy." *Neither a sustainable reinforcement of the nonproliferation regime nor substantial progress in multilateral arms control is in the offing*.

35

9. **After Iran Gets the Bomb**, James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh, *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2010.

"Despite international pressure, **Tehran is continuing its march toward getting a nuclear bomb** (or the ability to assemble one quickly). If it succeeds—as seems increasingly likely—the Middle East could become even more unstable. But **Washington would still be able to contain and mitigate the consequences of Iran's nuclear defiance**, keeping an abhorrent outcome from becoming a catastrophic one."

38

10. **Evolving Bioweapon Threats Require New Countermeasures**, Helen Purkitt and Virgen Wells, *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, October 6, 2006

Past, covert biowarfare activities in Iraq and South Africa as well as current civilian biotechnology research and development trends illustrate why control strategies will fail. Today, it is impossible to control the equipment, supplies, and knowledge needed to develop sophisticated or naturally occurring biological agents such as biological weapons. The time has come to design *public policies that will promote new transparency norms*.

44



UNIT 3

Foreign Policy Decision Making

Unit Overview

48

11. **Obama's Foreign Policy: The End of the Beginning**, George Friedman, *STRATEFOR Intelligence*, August 24, 2009

Obama's foreign policy is remarkably consistent with the policies of the Bush Administration in terms of U.S. withdrawal policies of Iraq and relations with European powers, Russia and China. In Afghanistan, the Obama regime has shifted "from a purely defensive posture to a mixed posture of selective offense and defense." This is hardly surprising since all U.S. presidents operate in a world of constraints with limited options. "Like all good **Presidents, Obama is leaving behind certain campaign promises to govern.**"

51

12. **In Search of Sustainable Security: Linking National Security, Human Security, and Collective Security to Protect America and Our World**, Gayle E. Smith, *Center for American Progress*, www.americanprogress.org, June 2008

Gayle Smith defines **different types of security and outlines the reasons why America's future national security and worldwide collective security coincide**. She also describes the challenges that the next president will face in moving U.S. policies toward a longer-term, sustainable security approach.

53

13. **A Hidden World, Growing beyond Control**, Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, *Washington Post*, July 19, 2010


"The **top-secret world the government** created in response to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, **has become so large, so unwieldy and so secretive that no one knows how much money it costs, how many people it employs, how many programs exist** within it or exactly how many agencies do the same work."

67

14. **DOD's Energy Challenge as Strategic Opportunity**, Armory B. Lovins, *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 57, Second Quarter 2010

America's DOD internal energy challenges were outlined in the 2008 report, *More Fight—Less Fuel*. **Addressing DOD's long-term energy challenges are likely to do more than any other investment single investment area** because "if fielded fuel supply needs shrink, so do its garrison costs for related training and maintenance." Lovins outlines current, near-term, and emerging efficiency technologies that may offer savings in land, sea, and air platforms. The solutions will require a focus on increasing endurance and resilience capabilities. **These approaches involve many of the same things that are required in other areas of national security, climate change, increasing jobs and U.S. competitiveness.**

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UNIT 4

Great Power Interstate Conflicts and Rivalries

Unit Overview

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15. **The OSCE and the 2010 Crisis in Kyrgyzstan**, *CSIS-IND TASK FORCE*, CSIS's Institute for New Democracies, May 14, 2010

Following **civil strife in Kyrgyzstan, leaders of Kazakhstan who chaired the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the United States, and Russia played a key role in preventing a civil war** and "**promoting a peaceful resolution of the civil unrest.**" While there are limits to what an intergovernmental organization can do, the "generally successful OSCE response to the crisis has enhanced the prestige of both the OSCE and the Kazakh government."

81

16. **Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power**, Edward Wong, *New York Times Online*, April 23, 2010

China is expanding its “naval power well beyond the Chinese coast,” to the Middle East, Africa, and “the Pacific where the United States Navy has long reigned as the dominant force,” as well as “extending its operational reach beyond the South China Sea and Philippines.” The strategy is a sharp break from the traditional doctrine of “preparing for war” with Taiwan or defending the Chinese coast. The United States and China have already clashed due to different definitions of “exclusive economic zones.” As China deploys new Jin-class submarines, some analysts predict China’s naval rise may in the future diminish America’s role throughout the world.

89

17. **The False Religion of Mideast Peace**, Aaron David Miller, *Foreign Policy*, May/June, 2010

The *United States* has been engaged in *the Middle East peace process* for decades *because of a belief that lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians and other Arab neighbors is possible.* This belief is now a religious doctrine with a “dogmatic creed that all incoming U.S. Presidents, including President Obama, have embraced.” Right now America *lacks the opportunity or will to do “truly big things”* on Arab–Israeli peacemaking.

91



UNIT 5

North-South Interstate Conflicts and Rivalries

Unit Overview

98

18. **The Next Empire?**, Howard W. French, *The Atlantic Monthly*, May 2010

“All across Africa, new tracks are being laid, highways built, ports deepened, commercial contracts signed—all on an unprecedented scale, and led by China, whose appetite for commodities seems insatiable.” Do China’s grand designs promise the transformation, at last, of a star-crossed continent? Or merely its exploitation? The author travels deep into the heart of Africa, searching for answers.

101

19. **Obama and Latin America: New Beginnings, Old Frictions**, Michael Shifter, *Current History*, February 2010

“Signs of frustration are unmistakable in Washington and in many Latin American capitals, despite Obama’s immense personal appeal and the continued promise of a more productive relationship.”

108



UNIT 6

Conflicts among Nation-States in the Global South, Sub-National Conflicts, and the Role of Non-State Actors in an Interdependent World

Unit Overview

114

20. **Organized Crime in Iraq: Strategic Surprise and Lessons for Future Contingencies**, Dr. Phil Williams, *PRISM*, 1, No. 2

The *United States was surprised after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the “rise of organized crime and its emergence as a postconflict spoiler.”* This development was simply not anticipated and was a major destabilizing factor increasing the sense of lawlessness and public insecurity, undermining the efforts to regenerate the economy, and financing the violent opposition to the occupation forces. Attempts to counter crime remains fragmented and *organized crime is likely to increase after the U.S. withdrawal* and given the continued weakness of the Iraqi state.

116

21. **Africa's Forever Wars**, Jeffrey Gettleman, *Foreign Policy*, March/April 2010
Some of *Africa's most brutal wars may never end because they are not really wars in the traditional sense but rather "opportunistic, heavily armed banditry"* by groups who assault civilians, rape women, and capture children to become child soldiers. According to Gettleman, the *only way to stop these rebels is to kill their leaders* who head these gangs rather than liberation movements. To support his thesis, Gettleman uses anecdotes from his interactions with several recent militias including Nkunda, former head of one of the militias in the eastern Congo, and Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord's Resistance Army.

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UNIT 7

Asymmetric Conflicts: Trends in Terrorism and Counterterrorism

Unit Overview

130

22. **Profiling: Sketching the Face of Jihadism**, Scott Stewart, *Global Security & Intelligence Report (STRATFOR)*, January 20, 2010

Terrorist profiles based on stereotypical notions are *no longer effective*. *Al-Qaeda is an adaptive opponent* that has always displayed *organizational flexibility* in terms of *tactics*. Moreover, al-Qaeda has no lack of operatives, including increased numbers of volunteers from the West. In such an environment, counter-terrorism operatives need to rely more on better intelligence, intuition, and common sense about certain behaviors rather than "pat profiles."

133

23. **Al-Shabab's Agenda in the Wake of the Kampala Suicide Attacks**, Tim Pippard, *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 3, Issue 7, July 2010

Al-Shabab, the Somali Islamist group that has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, demonstrated *expanded operational reach* with two simultaneous *suicide bombings in the Ugandan capital, Kampala*, on July 11, 2010. The bombings of a rugby club and Ethiopian restaurant left 76 civilians, who were watching the World Cup final on televisions, dead. These and other signs suggest *that al-Shabab will continue to evolve into a greater regional threat* to African and Western interests from its base in southern Somalia.

135

24. **Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency**, Dr. David J. Kilcullen, Paper presented at the United States Government Counterinsurgency Initiative Conference, September 2006


Last time the United States produced an inter-agency counterinsurgency doctrine was in 1962, and it didn't work very well. The conflict environment today is even more complicated as the *U.S. government must mobilize all agencies of the U.S. government, along with host nations, multiple foreign allies and coalition partners, non-government organizations, media, community groups, and business*. To cope and prepare for a long-term victory, Kilcullen *proposes an inter-agency counterinsurgency framework* based on three integrated pillars—economic, political, and security activities.

139

25. **Combating Terrorism with Socioeconomics: Leveraging the Private Sector**, Miemie Winn Byrd, *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 46, 3rd quarter, 2007

"Millions of Muslim boys in Asia are coming of age and creating a *'youth bulge,' consisting of mainly desperate, frustrated, and humiliated young men*." To counter these *conditions that will attract many to religious extremism*, the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) launched a *concept of operations* in the Philippines in 2002 that was used later in Iraq. The *approach relies* to a great extent on using *DOD Reserves and Guard members and links with the private sector* to open doors to the business community to develop *nontraditional networks* and partnerships.

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UNIT 8

Contemporary Foreign Policy Debates

Unit Overview

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26. **Defining Success in Afghanistan: What Can the United States Accept?**, Stephen Biddle, Fotini Christia, and J. Alexander Thier, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2010

“Many Americans are now *skeptical* that even a *stable and acceptable outcome in Afghanistan is possible*.” While none are perfect, “there is a *range of acceptable and achievable outcomes* for Afghanistan.” Biddle, Christia, and Thier outline these future possible outcomes and argue that the United States *can frame a workable definition of success in Afghanistan* based on past experiences.

151

27. **All Counterinsurgency Is Local**, Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, *Atlantic Monthly*, October 2008

The *U.S. engagement in Afghanistan is floundering* because of the *endemic failure to engage and protect rural villages* and to immunize them against insurgency. To reverse its fortunes in Afghanistan, *the United States needs to fundamentally reconfigure its operations, creating small development and security teams posted at new compounds in every district in the south and east of the country*. This approach would not necessarily require adding troops, although that would help—200 district-based teams of 100 people, each would require 20,000 personnel, one-third of the 60,000 foreign troops currently in the country.

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UNIT 9

International Organizations, International Law, and Global Governance

Unit Overview

158

28. **Millennium Development Goals: At a Glance**, *UN Department of Public Information*, April 2010

A recent summary of *the eight Millennium Development Goals*, some facts and figures, and examples of country progress. The Millennium Goals are to *eradicate* extreme *poverty* and hunger, *achieve universal primary education*, *promote gender equality* and empower women, *reduce child mortality*, *improve maternal health*, *combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases*, *environmental sustainability*, and global *partnership*.

161

29. **The African Standby Force, Genocide, and International Relations Theory**, Stephen Burgess, Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual General meeting, February 17–20, 2010

Increasingly, *powerful states are attempting to burden-shift responsibility for security to regional alliances* and organizations. Often important states in a region will agree to deliver security by implementing long-standing treaties such as the 1948 Genocide Convention, which obliges all nation-states to “prevent and punish.” Yet states more often than not fail to stop genocide in modern conflicts (i.e., Rwanda, Darfur, Bosnia) due to a lack of political will and often in developing regions a lack of military capacity. This case study explains the reasons for why a commitment to form an African standby Force (ASF) by 2010 has not yet been implemented. Key factors include the lack of political will to intervene in another African states, the lack of military capacity, and the lack of coordination among key organizations within the African Union or among outside powers to implement the concept of “African solutions for African problems.”

165

30. **Rethinking the Responsibility to Protect**, Alan Kuperman, *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, Winter/Spring 2009

Recent experience suggests that “the *Responsibility to Protect* not only *often fails to achieve its goal of protecting at-risk civilians*, but it may *also unintentionally put others in danger*. Even though the doctrine is quite new, it *already requires a major rethinking* if it is to promote its intended purpose of maximizing protection for innocent civilians.”

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UNIT 10

The International Economic System

Unit Overview

178

31. **China to the Rescue: Growing out of the Financial Crisis**, Joergen Oerstroem Moeller, *YaleGlobal*, July 28, 2009

Together the United States, Europe, and Japan account for more than half and maybe even two-thirds of the global economy depending upon the calculating method but the **only place where increasing demand can be found today are among the newcomers: China, India, and Southeast Asia**. After an initial downturn, the growth of domestic demand is helping China grow during the economic slowdown. To **“rebalance the world economy we need to look to growth from countries like China instead of the United States.”**

181

32. **Can the BRICs Become a Bloc?**, Timothy M. Shaw, *China Monitor*, June 2010

As the **balance in the world economy shifts from North to South**, the emerging and developing economies will match those in the North by 2020. At the core of these emerging economies are multinational corporations, sovereign wealth funds and the four BRIC nation-states. The importance of the **BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China)**, **has increased** in recent years but questions remains as to **how cohesive is this new “global middle?”** These countries have distinctive histories, geographies, economies, and political structures. The BRIC’s complicated, multiple, and varying interests often cause tensions within the group. Nevertheless, the BRICs contribute to new multilateralism as an **embryonic bloc**, “especially given the decline of United States unilateralism.” **“Whether this amounts to a ‘Beijing Consensus’ remains contentious.”**

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UNIT 11

Globalizing Issues

Unit Overview

186

33. **The New Population Bomb: The Four Megatrends That Will Change the World**, Jack A. Goldstone, *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2010

While the **world’s population will probably stabilize around 2050**, **“twenty-first-century international security will depend** more on how **the global population is composed and distributed . . .** and how demographics will influence population movements across regions.” **Key trends** include a **“reversal of fortunes” for people in the West** as their economies become less dynamic; the **aging population of Western** countries, Japan, South Korea, and even China; **increasingly youthful populations in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East** and **urban sprawl**. These trends and resulting consequences will pose serious challenges and require creative foreign and domestic policies. **“The strategic and economic policies of the twentieth century are obsolete, and it is time to find new ones.”**

188

34. **The World’s Water Challenge**, Erik R. Peterson and Rachel A. Posner, *Current History*, January 2010

“If oil is the key **geopolitical resource** of today, **water will be as important**—if not more so—in the **not-so-distant future**.”

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