Mitchell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 963 S.W.2d 222 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998)
On October 14, 1995, Sherri Mitchell was injured in an automobile accident while riding in a car owned by her father and operated by her husband. On October 26, 1995, Mitchell, age seventeen, signed a release with State Farm agreeing to settle her bodily injury claim for $2,500. No conservator was appointed at the time this release was signed. Mitchell filed a motion for declaratory judgment alleging that she lacked capacity at the time the release was executed, rendering it null and void. State Farm argued that Mitchell's marriage emancipated her, removing any disability she had as a minor, including the capacity to contract. The trial court decided in favor of State Farm and Mitchell appealed.
Emberton, Judge Ky. Rev. Stat. 387.010 defines minor as anyone under the age of eighteen. Ordinarily, a contract executed by a minor is enforceable by the minor but may be avoided by the minor if not affirmed by him after reaching adulthood. Although the minor has the legal capacity to contract, he has the privilege of avoiding the contract. Although, there are certain exceptions to this general rule, none is applicable to this case. Asettlement agreement and release of a third-party tortfeasor has been held to be voidable by the infant. A repudiation of the agreement requires that the minor return the consideration paid pursuant to that agreement.
The privilege bestowed upon a minor to avoid contracts made during infancy is given for policy reasons. Infants, as with other classes of disabilities, are presumed to be insufficiently mature or experienced to effectively bargain with those who have attained legal age, and any transaction which may result in a financial loss to them or in a depletion of their estates is scrutinized with care. Marriage of the infant emancipates the minor; it does not, however, make the minor sui juris. In Bensinger's CoEx'rs, the court declined to hold that an emancipated child must be bound by his contracts and followed the general rule that:
Although parental emancipation may free the infant from parental control, it does not remove all of the disabilities of infancy. It does not, for example, enlarge or affect the minor's capacity or incapacity to contract.
The rule may seem antiquated in view of the arguable maturity of today's youth. It may seem ironic that a minor can drive a car yet not be bound by the contract to purchase that car or be responsible for his torts and crimes yet unable to settle a dispute against a tortfeasor. The distinction to be made is that too frequently a contract involves negotiation and thought beyond the maturity of most people under the age of eighteen. We cannot adopt a rule that marriage by the minor somehow classifies him as more mature and intelligent than his unmarried counterpart. We, as did the court in Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc., find that logic and common sense would not encourage such a result since marriage by a minor too frequently may itself be indicative of a lack of wisdom and maturity.
The legislature has provided a means through which a conservator can be appointed to protect the financial interest of a married minor. Although the lack of such appointment will not render the contract void, the minor remains free to avoid his obligation under the contract.
Reversed and remanded in favor of Mitchell.