Chapter Summary

Interpretations of Schutz's Work

The sociological theory of Alfred Schutz (1899-1959), who is considered a classical theorist, has been influential in recent years in such areas of sociology as enthnomethodology and phenomenology. Ritzer and Goodman note that Schutz's interpreters tend to approach his work in one of three ways. First, ethnomethodologists take interest in Schutz's theory because of the emphasis it places on the ways in which actors construct social reality. Other interpreters of Schutz criticize this micro-sociological approach; they claim that it ignores the impact of macro-structures on social life. Third, some scholars have pegged Schutz as a cultural determinist whose theory emphasizes the many social constraints on actors. Ritzer and Goodman argue that a synthesis of the first and third views is in order, while the second position is simply wrong.

The Ideas of Edmund Husserl

The phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl (1858-1938) had a profound impact on Alfred Schutz's sociology. Husserl was mainly interested in creating a rigorous, scientific study of the structures and processes of consciousness. In order to do this, Husserl argued, philosophers must understand that people tend to view the world through the natural attitude. By bracketing the natural attitude, phenomenologists can study the properties of consciousness that govern action, conceived of as the ordering of the world.

While Husserl was interested primarily in examining consciousness, he did note the importance of lived experience and interaction in the life-world and intersubjectivity. One of Schutz's contributions to sociology is that he turned the emphasis of phenomenology away from consciousness to intersubjectivity and the life-world.

Science and the Social World

Schutz agreed with Husserl that phenomenology ought to be a rigorous, scientific enterprise. Schutz considered the intersubjective world of everyday life (the life-world) to be the paramount reality. Scientists, however, must detach themselves from this pragmatic orientation to the world in order to better analyze and observe it. While actors in the life-world derive their knowledge from the experience of everyday life and an accumulated stock of life-worldly knowledge, scientists draw what they know from the stock of knowledge of science. Science and everyday life are and ought to be considered as completely different worlds.

Schutz argued that in both everyday life and science, people rely on constructs or ideal types in order to interpret and grasp the relevant aspects of reality. Scientists, however, build their constructs or ideal types on the basis of the constructs of everyday life (typifications) — this is, in fact, what makes an objective science of subjective meaning structures possible. Schutz was thus primarily interested in constructing ideal types of social actors and actions. Ideal types, moreover, must meet certain criteria in order to meet the requirements of scientific rigor. Schutz propounded five such criteria for his ideal types: the postulates of relevance, adequacy, logical consistency, compatibility, and subjective interpretation.

Typifications and Recipes

Schutz argued that people engage in typification — the application of generic and homogeneous types to their experiences in the life-world. These typifications may take many forms, e.g., labeling, language, etc. Typifications are learned through the process of socialization, and one may view them as habitual or traditional tools for dealing with the many situations and problems that emerge in the living of everyday life. Schutz refers to some kinds of typifications as recipes, cookbook ways of dealing with experiences in the course of everyday life, which may be altered or abandoned if they fail to handle the situation effectively.

The Life-World

The world of everyday life is known as the life-world in Schutz's sociology. People are oriented to the life-world in the natural attitude, in which the world is taken for granted until a problematic situation emerges. Schutz maintained that the life-world is defined by six characteristics. First, it is characterized by wide-awakeness as its tension of consciousness. Second, the world is taken for granted; actors suspend any doubt of the existence of the life-world. Third, people work in the life-world — they "gear into" the life-world. Fourth, people experience the working self as the total self in the life-world. Fifth, the social life of the life-world is characterized by intersubjectivity. Sixth, the actor's flow of time intersects with the flow of time of society.

It is crucial to note that Schutz viewed the life-world as having been created by the actions of people in the past. One's life-world, in other words, predates an individual's birth and is given to them to struggle with and attempt to transform. The life-world is therefore constraining, and people are always trying to shape or dominate it. Another important dimension of the life-world is knowledge. Schutz emphasized actors' knowledge of typifications and recipes, skills, and useful knowledge.

Intersubjectivity

Intersubjectivity, in a narrow, technical sense, is the simultaneous understanding of another's subjectivity and one's own consciousness. Schutz, however, tended to use intersubjectivity to refer to anything social. Knowledge, for example, is intersubjective insofar as it involves reciprocity of perspectives, a social origin, and a social distribution.

Realms of the Social World

Schutz argued for the existence of four basic realms of social reality. The future, or Folgewelt, is completely open-ended and therefore not amenable to sociological analysis. The past, or Vorwelt, has already occurred and is therefore more amenable to sociological study, but it is very susceptible to misinterpretation. The Umwelt involves face-to-face relationships with "consociates." It is characterized by "we" relations, which are defined by a high degree of knowledge of those involved in the interaction. The Umwelt is one realm for which the sociologist can construct rational models and ideal types in order to understand interaction. The Mitwelt, which is characterized by "they" relations, refers to the realm in which people deal with types of people and social structures (impersonal contemporaries) rather than other actors. The Mitwelt is also accessible to sociological analysis.

Consciousness, Meanings, and Motives

Schutz argued that sociologists must differentiate between meanings and motives. Meanings, according to Schutz, refer to the ways in which people decide which facets of the social world are relevant. Subjective meaning contexts refer to processes in which people define reality through their own independent mental constructions; they are difficult to study scientifically. Objective meaning contexts exist in society and are shared by the collectivity of actors; they are therefore more accessible to scientific study.

Motives, on the other hand, refer to the reasons people give for their actions. "In-order-to motives" refer to the reasons an actor engages in certain actions; they are intended to bring about something in the future. They are subjective and are therefore difficult to study sociologically. "Because motives" are objective, retrospective views of the factors that may have caused an individual to do what he/she did. They are amenable to sociological analysis.

Interpreting Schutzian Theory

Ritzer and Goodman argue that it is important to see Schutz's work as an attempt to construct a theoretical perspective that emphasizes both how actors create the social world and the impact of the social world on actors.