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| 1 | Competition policy is an exclusive competency of the EU. |
 | A) | True |
| B) | False |
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| 2 | Of the following four answers only one does not provide an economic reason for having transferred the powers from Member States to the EU with respect to competition policy. |
| A) | Competition policy is about correcting market failures. Correcting market failures is always an argument for transferring powers to a higher level of governance like the EU. |
| B) | The creation of the Common Market is the creation of a large market across borders in the EU member states. The Competition policy of the EU could thus be seen as an instrument to deal with these cross border issues. |
| C) | Competition policy is an insurance policy of the EU against anti-competitive behavior from countries outside the European Union, thus securing the EU towards non-tariff trade barriers. |
| D) | The exclusive competence of the EU in the competition policy area gives the EU and EU markets credibility and negotiation power vis-à-vis other trading areas and trade powers in the world. |
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| 3 | The EU allows Member States to subsidize some firms, but controls these cases strictly. |
| A) | True |
| B) | False |
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| 4 | Which of the following statements represent a correct description of what happens under perfect collusion in the BE-COMP diagram setting?
(More than one answer is correct): |
| A) | Under perfect collusion the price that can be taken in the merged market can be compared to a monopoly price where the firms act as though they were only one single firm. |
| B) | Under perfect collusion the total number of firms theoretically could be 2n’. |
| C) | Under perfect collusion the size of firms are higher than under full competition. |
| D) | Perfect collusion is easily maintained by firms |
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| 5 | A firm implicated in a cartel can get immunity by revealing the cartel to the Commission. |
| A) | True |
| B) | False |
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| 6 | The main elements of EU competition policy are: |
| A) | ensure that firms do not abuse a dominant position in the market. |
| B) | ensure that no firm attains a dominant position in the market. |
| C) | ensure that firms do not engage in anticompetitive practices. |
| D) | Both 1) and 3) |
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| 7 | In the BE-COMP diagram analysis, integration plus subsidies that allow all firms that existed before integration to stay in business will: |
| A) | lower welfare and this is why state aid is forbidden in the EU. |
| B) | result in overall welfare gains but not as great as if industry rationalization were allowed to occur. |
| C) | would cost EU taxpayers more than EU consumers would gain. |
| D) | none of the above is true. |
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| 8 | The EU citizens are most angry of the inefficiency effect among the two economic effects of a cartel |
| A) | True |
| B) | False |
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| 9 | It is often the case that firms could charge a higher price in one Member State than another if there were no arbitrage. So some firms have sought to segment those markets with: |
| A) | Exclusive territories for retailers and market sharing agreements. |
| B) | Tariffs and quotas. |
| C) | Technical barriers to trade in the form of Single Market directives. |
| D) | 2 and 3 are true. |
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| 10 | What can be said to be the main economic aim of EU competition policy regarding mergers): |
| A) | to succeed in getting entry and exit in the industry to be unrestricted, so the number of firms are as large as possible which automatically will drive the prices down to the lower average costs, P″=AC″. |
| B) | to succeed in getting entry and exit in the industry to be unrestricted, and the remaining firms not to collude, which will drive the price down to the lower average costs, P″ = AC'. |
| C) | to succeed in getting as many firms to merge, in order to benefit from the economies of scale in the larger market driving the price down to the lower average costs, P″ = AC'. |
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| 11 | The EU allows production subsidies in the case of: |
| A) | firms located in disadvantaged regions, but these subsidies must be capped. |
| B) | Member States who are particularly power in the Council of Ministers. |
| C) | industries where the subsidy does not distort Single Market competition, such as cultural events. |
| D) | none of the above. |
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| 12 | Which of the following other EU policy areas are particularly dependent on a well-functioning EU competition policy?
(More than one answer is correct) |
| A) | Justice and Home Affairs |
| B) | Monetary Policy. |
| C) | Economic Policy |
| D) | Internal Market Policy |
| E) | Labour Market Policy |
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| 13 | The EU Competition Network is a network of EU main industrial companies seeking exchanging best practices in how to improve EU’s competitive market positions in the rest of the world. |
| A) | True |
| B) | False |
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| 14 | One of the main rationales and legal basis of the over 400 state aid measures given to the financial sector under the global financial crisis in the EU in the late 2000’s is to underpin financial stability while at the same time minimizing distortions of competition between banks and across nations. |
| A) | True |
| B) | False |
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| 15 | Is it possible under EU competition policy rules to fine non-EU companies? |
| A) | True |
| B) | False |
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| 16 | The rules giving guidelines for competitive behavior regarding horizontal and vertical cooperation are found in the following treaty article / regulation (only one answer is correct): |
| A) | Article 101 |
| B) | Article 102 |
| C) | The Merger regulation |
| D) | Article 107 (on state aid) |
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| 17 | Which of the following measures are not possible for the EU to use in its competition policy? Only one answer is correct: |
| A) | Requiring firms to transfer some of their products to their competitors |
| B) | Giving fines to firms |
| C) | Requiring another board to take over the leadership of the firm until EU competition rules are upheld |
| D) | Requiring firms to pay back illegal state aid. |