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| 1 | |
Suppose that it is conceivable for a person to exist and not have a body. Does this prove that the mind is separate from the body? Why or why not? |
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| 2 | |
Explain why the problem of other minds is a problem for Cartesian Dualism. |
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| 3 | |
Suppose that Duncan McDougall is correct that people lose ¾ to 1½ ounces at the moment of death. Would this lend credibility to the theory of Cartesian Dualism? Why or why not? |
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| 4 | |
Suppose that, as Descartes claimed, the mind is indivisible. Would that lend credibility to the theory of Cartesian Dualism? Why or why not? |
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| 5 | |
Is Cartesian Dualism consistent with modern science? Why or why not? |
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| 6 | |
Explain the implications of Searle's brain replacement thought experiment. |
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| 7 | |
What does the perfect pretender thought experiment show about behavioral dispositions? |
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| 8 | |
Explain how Nagel's bat thought experiment attempts to undermine identity theory. |
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| 9 | |
Explain the significance of the fact that brain states are knowable by empirical investigation but mental states are not. |
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| 10 | |
What does Lewis's pained Martian thought experiment show about the identity theory? |
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| 11 | |
Explain the absent qualia objection. |
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| 12 | |
Explain the inverted spectrum problem. |
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| 13 | |
What does Searle's Chinese room thought experiment show? |
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| 14 | |
Explain why intentionality creates a problem for functionalism. |
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| 15 | |
Is being in a certain functional state a necessary or sufficient condition for being in a certain mental state? Why or why not? |
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| 16 | |
What does Searle's thought experiment about Chevrolet station wagons show? |
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| 17 | |
What is the point of Jackson's thought experiment about the color-challenged scientist? |
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| 18 | |
Is it possible to provide a complete account of the world in purely physical terms? Why or why not? |
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| 19 | |
Is folk psychology an inadequate psychological theory? Why or why not? |
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| 20 | |
Is eliminative materialism a good theory of mind? Why or why not? |
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| 21 | |
What does it mean to say that intentionality is a primitive property? |
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| 22 | |
Explain the concept of downward causation and why it implies that human behavior cannot be explained in purely materialist terms. |
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| 23 | |
How does contemporary property dualism differ from substance dualism? |
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| 24 | |
How does the existence of downward causation help solve the problem of free will? |
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| 25 | |
Why does Searle's view of mental and physical properties seem to be a form of epiphenomenalism? |
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