Although Social Exchange Theory has generated a great deal of research, it does have its detractors and has received some serious criticisms. We will review four major critiques of the theory and its assumptions.

The first criticism is that Social Exchange Theory is not testable. As we discussed in Chapter 3, one important criterion of a theory is that it is testable and capable of being proven false. The difficulty with social exchange is that its central concepts—costs and rewards—are not clearly defined. As Sabatelli and Shehan (1993) note:

It becomes impossible to make an operational distinction between what people value, what they perceive as rewarding, and how they behave. Rewards, values, and actions appear to be defined in terms of each other (Turner, 1978). Thus, it is impossible to find an instance when a person does not act in ways so as to obtain rewards. (p. 396)

When the theory argues that people do what they can to maximize rewards and then also argues that what people do is rewarding behavior, it is difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle the two concepts. As long as Social Exchange Theory operates with these types of circular definitions, it will be untestable and, thus, unsatisfactory in terms of that criterion. However, Roloff (1981) observes that some work has been done to create lists of rewards in advance of simply observing what people do and labeling that as rewarding because people are doing it. Edna Foa and Uriel Foa (1974, 1976) began this work of clearly defining rewards. Further, Roloff argues that despite this problem, there has been a great deal of empirical work using Social Exchange theories.

A second problem area has to do with the conceptualization of human beings painted by Social Exchange Theory. In this theoretical framework, humans are seen as rational calculators, coming up with numerical equations to represent their relational life. Many people object to this understanding of humans, asking whether people really rationally calculate the costs and rewards to be realized when engaging in a behavior or pursuing a relationship. Social Exchange, like many theories, assumes a great deal of cognitive awareness and activity, which several researchers have questioned (Berger & Roloff, 1980). Researchers have not come to a definitive answer about how much people calculate their relational life, but this calculation probably ebbs and flows according to many factors. First, some contexts may make people more self-aware than others. As LaTasha and Meredith receive more pressure to decide about college, they may think about their relationship more than they did when they were younger. Second, some individual differences might affect how people process information. Some people are more self-aware than others (Snyder, 1979). As researchers continue to work with this theory, they must account for these and other factors relative to the calculating nature of humans.

A third problem area is related to the second. Critics wonder if people are really as self-interested as Social Exchange Theory assumes. Steve Duck (1994) argues that applying a marketplace mentality to the understanding of relational life vastly misrepresents what goes on in relationships. He suggests that it is wrong to think about personal relationships in the same way that we think about business transactions, like buying a house or a car. This suggestion relates to the ontological assumptions one brings to the theory, as we discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. For some people, the analogy of the marketplace is appropriate, but for others it is not and may be highly offensive. How people evaluate the analogy depends on the ontological framework they bring to the theory.

The final critique also focuses on ontological assumptions. This complaint suggests that Social Exchange Theory fails to explain the importance of group solidarity in its emphasis on individual need fulfillment (England, 1989). This critique combines some of the issues raised above and argues that "the exchange framework can be viewed as valuing the separative self to the extent that rationality and self-interest are emphasized" (Sabatelli & Shehan, 1993, p. 397). By prioritizing this value, the connected self is overlooked and undervalued.

In sum, the Social Exchange perspective provides us with a framework that many researchers have used profitably. Yet, it does not offer a clear definition of its central concepts, which leads to difficulty in actually testing the theory. Further, it presumes several things about humans that some find difficult to accept. The notion of people calculating their self-interest apart from a group's is offensive to some researchers. Yet, the emphasis that Thibaut and Kelley place on interdependence is congruent with many researchers' notions of interpersonal relationships, and Social Exchange Theory continues to generate research findings of interest to students of communication.