

Post-1989 Nationalism DBQ

Directions: The following question is based on the accompanying Documents 1-11. The documents have been edited for the purpose of this exercise. Your teacher may provide additional instructions and advice to use when answering the question below.

Prompt: Analyze the various ideas regarding nationalism in Europe since 1989 and how these ideas affected government policies.

Historical Background: Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increase in nationalistic and xenophobic behavior in Europe, particularly in the areas that had previously been under communist rule.

Document 1

Source: Speech by Slobodan Milosevic, delivered to 1 million people at the central celebration marking the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, held at Gazimestan on 28 June, 1989.

Let the memory of Kosovo heroism live forever!
Long live Serbia!
Long live Yugoslavia!

Document 2

Source: Helmut Kohl's (former West German/German chancellor) Ten-Point Plan for German Unity presented to the Bundestag (German Parliament), November 28, 1989.

With this comprehensive policy we are working towards a condition of peace in Europe in which the German people can regain their unity in free self-determination. Reunification – that is, regaining Germany's state unity – remains the political aim of the federal government. We are grateful that we have received renewed support from our friends and partners in the declaration of the Brussels NATO summit in May of this year.

Document 3

Source: Vaclav Havel, former Czechoslovakian dissident, leader of the 1989 Velvet Revolution, and the first democratically elected president of Czechoslovakia after the fall of communism, New Year's Address to the Nation, Jan. 1, 1990.

Only thus can we restore our self-respect and our respect for one another as well as the respect of other nations.

Our state should never again be an appendage or a poor relative of anyone else. It is true that we must accept and learn many things from others, but we must do this in the future as their equal partners, who also have something to offer.

Document 4

Source: "The Emergence of Nationalism Under Gorbachev" by Allegra Weschler, *Columbia University Journal of Politics & Society* (formerly *Helvidius: The Columbia Undergraduate Journal of Law and Public Policy*), 1993.

As countries in Eastern Europe gained real independence from Moscow in 1989, the Baltic republics began to agitate for freedom. As the Baltics sought independence, the Ukraine and Byelorussia and the republics in the Caucasus became interested as well. Finally, as these republics moved towards autonomy, the remaining republics joined them.

Document 5

Source: BBC News, Protest Over Slovak Language Law, Sept. 2009.

Slovak must be used in all official contacts, including the police, armed forces, fire brigade, postal services and local government, with a number of exceptions for minority languages like Hungarian.

But "official contacts" are not clearly defined. The impact of the law on cultural events, and on live reports in minority languages on television and radio, is also not clear.

More than half a million ethnic Hungarians live in Slovakia, and many regard the new law as the latest in a series of crackdowns by the Slovak government against their culture.

Document 6

Source: Stefan Wolff, Ethnic Minorities in Europe: The Basic Facts. Centre for International Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution

Pre-1990 National Minorities

Ethnic Hungarians in Romania (almost 2 million), the Slovak Republic (about 600,000), Serbia (Vojvodina – about 400,000) and Ukraine (about 200,000)

Ethnic Germans in Russia and the successor states of the former Soviet Union (about 1.5 million), in different parts of Romania (about 80,000), Poland (about 150,000), Hungary (about 120,000), and the Czech and Slovak Republics (about 50,000)

Ethnic Romanians in Ukraine (460,000) and Hungary (25,000)

Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo (1.8 million), Macedonia (480,000), Southern Serbia (80,000) and Montenegro (50,000)

Turkish Muslims in Bulgaria (800,000), the Sandzak area of Serbia & Montenegro (250,000), and Macedonia (100,000)

Ethnic Poles in Belarus (420,000), Lithuania (260,000), and Ukraine (220,000)

Ethnic Ukrainians in Romania (67,000) and Poland (300,000)

Ethnic Belarusians in Poland (200,000)

Post-1990 National Minorities

Ethnic Russians in the former successor states (25.3 million)

Ethnic Ukrainians (6.8 million) in Russia, Moldova, Belarus, and the Baltic States

Ethnic Belarusians (2.1 million) in Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic states.

Ethnic Slovaks in the Czech Republic (300,000)

Ethnic Czechs in the Slovak Republic (59,000)

Ethnic Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks in the successor states of Yugoslavia (about 1 million)

Source Credit: Table 2: The main national minorities in contemporary Europe” from “Ethnic Minorities in Europe: The Basic Facts” by Stefan Wolff, posted at <http://www.stefanwolff.com/files-eu.pdf>

Document 7

Source: Radio France International (RFI) article on the annual report of the French Consultative Commission on Human Rights, March, 2013.

In an opinion poll commissioned for the report 55 per cent of respondents said that the practise of Islam should not be encouraged in France and that Muslims form a group apart in society. It also found resentment of Roma and immigrants, with 69 per cent saying that there are too many immigrants in France and believing that they do not want to integrate into French life, a rise of 10 per cent on 2011.

Document 8

Source: Charles Hawley and Daryl Lindsey, German journalists, Spiegel Online*, August 2012.

But for all the myriad groups focused on combating racism and right-wing extremism that have sprung up around Germany in the last 20 years, anti-foreigner hate and violence remains prevalent in the country. Hardly a week goes by without new reports of swastikas being daubed on gravestones at Jewish cemeteries, bricks being thrown through the windows of Turkish restaurants, immigrants being beaten up or even mobs chanting "foreigners out" as they chased eight Indians across a town square.

While a worrying number of the attacks take place in western Germany -- indeed, statistics from the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Germany's domestic intelligence agency, show that the frequency of right-wing violent crimes in the west is similar to that in the east -- eastern Germany, a region of 15 million with a foreigner population of a mere 6 percent, remains ground zero of the country's extremist problem.

* German news magazine

Document 9

Source: Sindre Bangstad, writer of a Guardian article, *After Anders Breivik's* conviction, Norway must confront Islamophobia*, August 2012.

Following the 22/7 trial, it will no longer be possible for Norwegian extreme rightwing Islamophobes to deny that Breivik* was in fact inspired and motivated by their ideals, fabrications and distortions. Nor will it be possible for the Progress party, Norway's third most popular party, to deny that its political rhetoric on Islam and Muslims in Norway was part of the ideological formation of Breivik, who was one of their dedicated party members for about 10 years until 2006. After a national trauma, the verdict presents us with the opportunity to finally face and confront the hatred in our midst with the honesty, seriousness and commitment it requires of us all.

* Anders Breivik was convicted of the worst atrocity in Norway since World War II, claiming a total of 77 lives.

Document 10

Source: Open Society Justice Commission submission to the UN Human Rights Committee: Review of Germany, Oct. 2012.

Several primary and secondary schools in Berlin are segregating migrant children in separate classes from native-born German students on the putative grounds that their German language skills are inadequate for regular classes. In fact, although they speak German as a second language (in most cases), their language skills generally are adequate for regular classes, but serve as a proxy for discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or other suspect criteria.

Document 11

Source: Dan Bilefsky, writer of a New York Times article about Hashim Thaci, prime minister of Kosovo and former leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army, July 2013.

Although he has been widely credited with shepherding Kosovo toward independence — Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. has called him the “George Washington of Kosovo” — his government has also faced repeated accusations of rampant corruption. In May, he suffered another blow when a European Union court here ordered the arrest of seven former K.L.A. commanders accused of war crimes, including two former close aides.