To Kyoto and Beyond

The Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro laid out a hopeful path. The economically developed countries (EDCs) that signed the Global Warming Convention agree to a voluntary program to stabilize emissions at their 1990s levels by the year 2000. They also resolved that in 1997 they would reconvene in Japan to review their progress in restraining the emission of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other gases that most scientists agree are causing the mean global temperature to rise slowly but potentially disastrously.

Like many paths paved with good intentions, the journey to Kyoto did not fulfill its promise. Many of the EDCs had made no progress toward meeting the goals set in 1992. Also, many of the economically less developed countries (LDCs) have generated increasing levels of greenhouse gases. As if to underline this reality, while the delegations from 166 countries gathered in Kyoto in December 1997, the worst El Nintildeo of the century--some say in history--was causing weather that deluged some areas of the world, caused droughts in others, and spawned an unusual rash of tornadoes, typhoons, and other violent climatic events.

The proposals at Kyoto about how to halt global warming were as varied as the types of weather associated with El Nintildeo. The Americans advocated a cut in average emissions levels during the period 2008 to 2012 back to 1990 levels. The Europeans suggested a more stringent cut in emissions to 15 percent below 1990 levels by 2010. The LDCs proposed that by 2020 the EDCs cut emissions to 35 percent below 1990 levels.

No one expected the LDCs to meet the same targets as the EDCs, but the United States and other countries wanted participation by some LDCs, such as China and India, and mandated limits on LDC emissions growth beginning in 2010. As President Clinton put the U.S. position, there had to be "meaningful participation by key developing nations."¹

The LDCs objected to this. Mark Mwandosya of Tanzania, who headed the LDC caucus in Kyoto, explained, "Very many of us are struggling to attain a decent standard of living for our people. And yet we are constantly told that we must share in the effort to reduce emissions so that industrialized countries can continue to enjoy the benefits of their wasteful lifestyle."² Also vociferous were the delegates from small island countries, which are threatened as the seas rise from melting ice caps. The people of the islands are "like little ants making a home of a leaf floating on a pond," complained President Teburoro Tito of Kiribati. "And the elephants [the EDC] go to drink and roughhouse in the water. The problem isn't the ants' behavior. It's a problem of how to convince the elephants to be more gentle."³ From yet another perspective, the LDCs that rely on petroleum exports worried that they would lose $20 billion a year if tougher emissions standards were adopted.

There were also numerous proposals about how to help LDCs pay for pollution abatement projects. The United States wanted an EDC that provided financial assistance to an LDC for emissions reductions to count part of the LDC's reductions against its own (the EDC's) emissions quota. Brazil wanted EDCs that failed to meet the target to have to pay fines into a fund that would help LDCs finance energy-friendly projects.

The negotiations at Kyoto were intense as Vice President Al Gore and other diplomats tried to balance the pressure to address the environment with their own country's economic interests. Cost estimates vary widely, with projections of the funds needed globally to stabilize CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere ranging from $3 trillion to $10 trillion. For example, according to one prominent economist, U.S. energy prices would have to double to cut U.S. emissions back to 1990 levels. It may be, though, that at least some of these costs can be offset by savings. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that introducing energy-efficient methods would lead to net energy savings. Critics charge that figures projecting net savings are best-case scenarios chosen because they minimize the impact of the changes that will have to be made. Moreover, costs will not be spread evenly within or across countries. Some countries and regions may economically benefit from global warming, as agricultural production rises and heating costs go down. For other countries and regions, though, climatic conditions will make them too hot, too wet, or too dry for current economic activity.

Diplomats also had to keep a wary eye on the willingness of citizens and interest groups in their respective countries to support mandatory emissions limits and their associated costs. One series of polls found that majorities of Americans (69 percent), Australians (72 percent), Germans (71 percent), and Japanese (60 percent) agree that protecting the environment should be given priority over economic growth.⁴ Another poll reported that a strong plurality of Americans was willing to bear some costs to ease or reverse global warming. Asked, "Would you be willing to invest in new appliances and insulation to cut household emissions of greenhouse gases?" 47 percent of Americans said "yes," 21 percent said "no," 10 percent said "it depends," and 4 percent said they were "already doing it." It must be said, though, that this survey, like others, found that as the cost of meeting environmental goals goes up, public support for increasing taxes to meet those costs rapidly declines. For example, only 2 percent of Americans were willing to pay higher taxes on gasoline and other fossil fuels to restrain their use or to pay to develop less polluting alternatives.⁵

Almost inevitably, the environmental and economic cross-pressures led to a compromise. The treaty concluded in Kyoto stipulates that-

The EDCs must reduce CO2, methane, and other greenhouse gas emissions by 6 to 8 percent below their respective 1990 levels by 2012. The U.S. cut will be 7 percent; Europe's will be 8 percent; Japan's 6 percent. The U.S. cut would mean annual maximum emissions of 1.25 billion tons of greenhouse gases, compared to current emissions of about 1.5 billion tons and estimated emissions without restraints of 1.7 billion tons in 2010.

EDCs can trade emissions quotas among themselves. That is, if, say, the United States fails to meet its goal, it can buy tons of emissions quotas from an EDC that has more than met its goal.

No sanctions for failure to meet standards were set. The parties to the treaty will meet in the future to establish sanctions.

The LDCs are exempt from binding standards but may opt to adopt voluntary goals.

The treaty will go into effect when ratified by at least 55 countries representing at least 55 percent of the world's emissions of greenhouse gases.

Supporters greeted the compromise with faint praise. "This is a modest step forward in what will be a long-term battle to protect the Earth's climate system," said a representative of the Union of Concerned Scientists. "The alternative--collapse and gridlock--would have been a disaster."⁶ Scientists also pointed out that even if fully implemented the treaty would not stop global warming. First, while in 2012 EDCs will produce 30 percent less than they would have without restraints, the level of emissions will continue to add greenhouse gases to the atmosphere faster than the Earth can eliminate them. Second, LDC emissions will continue to go up. Therefore, "what Kyoto will do," predicted one scientist, "is produce a small decrease in the rate of increase" in greenhouse gas emissions.⁷

Other observers were caustic in their denunciations. A World Wildlife Fund spokesperson charged that the treaty, without sanctions and with milder emissions cuts than proposed originally, "plays into the hands [of industry]." From the opposite perspective, many business leaders were equally scathing. "This agreement represents unilateral economic disarmament [by the EDCs]. It is a terrible deal, and the president should not sign it," said the chairman of the Global Climate Coalition, a U.S. business lobbying group. "If he does," the chairman predicted, "business, labor, and agriculture will campaign hard and will defeat it [when it goes to the Senate for ratification]."

Giving credibility to that prediction, leaders from both houses of the U.S. Congress rushed to denounce the treaty. Senate majority leader Trent Lott declared that Congress "will not ratify a flawed treaty."⁸ Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich called the treaty an "outrage" that would cripple the U.S. economy.⁹ President Clinton rejoined that "every time we've tried to improve the American environment in the last 25 or 30 years, somebody has predicted that it would wreck the economy." To the contrary, the president went on, "the air is [now] cleaner, the food supply is safer, there are fewer toxic waste dumps. And the last time I checked, we had the lowest unemployment rate in 20 years. So don't believe the skeptics."¹⁰

Perhaps, but given the uproar, Vice President Gore left Kyoto without signing the treaty. President Clinton voiced support of the treaty but did not indicate when he would sign it and submit it to the Senate. Even relatively friendly senators were cautious about the prospects of the treaty. John Kerry indicated that he "would counsel the president to go very slowly as to ratification."¹¹ All that is certain politically then, is that, as one White House spokesperson put it, "the game is afoot."¹² That is true both in Washington, D.C., and in the capitals of many other countries.

Whatever the political maneuvering, a few things are clear. One is that greenhouse gas concentrations continue to mount in the atmosphere. Second, the Earth's temperature is rising, the oceans are rising, and global weather appears to be getting more volatile. Many scientists attribute these changes to greenhouse gases. Third, the costs of halting, much less reversing, the buildup of greenhouse cases will be in the trillions of dollars and, a bit less surely, lifestyle changes may be necessary. It is hard to envision, for instance, how the current American love affair with gas-guzzling sport utility vehicles can coexist with reducing U.S. emissions to below 1990 levels. Fourth, it is very unlikely that progress can be made in stabilizing or reducing greenhouse gas emissions without LDC participation. It is easy to criticize their exemption from the Kyoto agreement, but one must also answer the question posed by Malawi's minister of environment: "How can we devote our precious [financial] resources towards reducing emissions when we are struggling every day just to feed, clothe, and house our citizens?"¹³

What is also clear is that the path beyond Kyoto goes somewhere, whatever the decisions in the world's capitals are. One road, which involves taking strong measures to reduce greenhouse emissions will, even by optimistic estimates, be costly and may well alter lifestyles. The alternative path involves no decisions or only superficial gestures. The destination of that path evokes the ancient Chinese adage that tells us, "If you continue on the road you are on you will get to where it leads."

Notes

1. New York Times, December 12, 1997, p. A1.

2. New York Times, November 20, 1997, p. A7.

3. New York Times, December 1, 1997, p. K9.

4. Washington Post, November 15, 1997, p. A20.

5. New York Times, November 28, 1997, p. A36.

6. Hartford Courant, December 11, 1997, p. A1.

7. New York Times, November 3, 1997, p. A12.

8. Hartford Courant, December 11, 1997, p. A1.

9. New York Times, December 12, 1997, p. A1.

10. New York Times, December 12, 1997, p. A1.

11. Hartford Courant, December 11, 1997, p. A1.

12. New York Times, December 12, 1997, p. A1.

13. New York Times, December 13, 1997, p. A7.