TAKING SIDES: Clashing Views on Controversial Issues in Cognitive Science
PART 1. Mind and Brain
New! ISSUE 1. Are Mind and Brain the Same?
New! YES: Paul C.L. Tang, from “A Review Essay: Recent Literature on Cognitive Science,” Social Science Journal (1999)
New! NO: Jon Mills, from “Five Dangers of Materialism,” Genetic, Social & General Psychology Monographs (February 2002)
Philosophy professor Paul C. L. Tang explains the argument that anything usually attributed to the mind is only brain activity by describing the position of Paul Churchland, a leader in the field of cognitive science. Researcher Jon Mills points out five dangers of dismissing a concept of mind, such as the elimination of free will and a sense of self, and instead proposes a psychic holism.
New! ISSUE 2. Do Children Develop Theories About Other People’s Minds?
New! YES: Henry Wellman, David Cross, and Julanne Watson, from “Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development: The Truth About False Belief,” Child Development (2001)
New! NO: Brian J. Scholl and Alan M. Leslie, from “Minds, Modules, and Meta-Analysis,” Child Development (2001)
Senior research scientist Henry Wellman and his colleagues, David Cross and Julanne Watson, present a meta-analysis revealing support for their belief that stage-related conceptual changes bring about an understanding of theory-of-mind in small children. Cognitive researchers Brian Scholl and Alan Leslie argue that the data do not support conceptual change but rather the development of innate specific skills that lead to children’s understanding of theory-of-mind.
New! ISSUE 3. Is Mindfulness a Cognitive Style?
New! YES: Robert J. Sternberg, from “Images of Mindfulness,” Journal of Social Issues (2000)
New! NO: Ellen J. Langer and Mihnea Moldoveanu, from “The Construct of Mindfulness,” Journal of Social Issues (2000)
American Psychological Association president Robert Sternberg makes the case that the concept of mindfulness would be enhanced by association with the area of cognitive styles. Psychology professors Ellen Langer and Mihnea Moldoveanu find Sternberg’s cognitive style category inadequate and much too restrictive for the concept of mindfulness. PART 2. Concepts
New! ISSUE 4. Are We Overestimating Infants' Math Ability?
New! YES: Leslie B. Cohen and Kathryn S. Marks, from “How Infants Process Addition and Subtraction Events,” Developmental Science (2002)
New! NO: Karen Wynn, from “Do Infants Have Numerical Expectations or Just Perceptual Preferences?” Developmental Science (2002)
Professor of psychology Leslie Cohen and his research associate Kathryn Marks make the case that infants prefer to stare longer, and thus respond more, to familiar situations as compared to novel ones, and that this has been mistaken for numerical understanding. Psychologist and researcher Karen Wynn argues that her assumptions are sound, and that infants are capable of calculating the outcomes of very basic addition and subtraction problems.
New! ISSUE 5. Can Infants Develop Abstract Concepts?
New! YES: Jean M. Mandler, from “Perceptual and Conceptual Processes in Infancy,” Journal of Cognition and Development (2000)
New! NO: Eleanor J. Gibson, from “Commentary on Perceptual and Conceptual Processes in Infancy,” Journal of Cognition and Development (2000)
Research professor of cognitive science Jean Mandler provides evidence to show that, counter to traditional cognitive developmental theory, infants are capable of abstract conceptual processing. National Medal of Science recipient Eleanor Gibson questions the assumptions Mandler makes regarding preverbal infants and presents her own view that perceptual development leads children into conceptual processing.
New! ISSUE 6. Is Sensory Information the Strongest Part of a Stored Concept?
New! YES: Helen Bird, David Howard, and Sue Franklin, from “Why Is a Verb Like an Inanimate Object?” Brain and Language (2000)
New! NO: Kevin Shapiro and Alfonso Caramazza, from “Sometimes a Noun Is Just a Noun: Comments on Bird, Howard, and Franklin,” Brain and Language (2001)
Researchers and lecturers Helen Bird, David Howard, and Sue Franklin present research consistent with a new model of knowledge representation that emphasizes sensory and functional categories. Linguistic researchers Kevin Shapiro and Alfonso Caramazza provide numerous challenges to the new model and caution against a search for one explanatory model. PART 3. Memory
New! ISSUE 7. Is Novice Memory Based on Associations?
New! YES: Pertti Saariluoma and Tei Laine, from “Novice Construction of Chess Memory,” Scandinavian Journal of Psychology (2001)
New! NO: Fernand Gobet, from “Chunk Hierarchies and Retrieval Structures: Comments on Saariluoma and Laine,” Scandinavian Journal of Psychology (2001)
Cognitive scientists Pertti Saariluoma and Tei Laine present the case that through computer simulation they can demonstrate that associations made between frequent types of chess pieces and the colors of the pieces were the most salient aspects in novices learning chess patterns. Professor of intelligence systems Fernand Gobet argues that Saariluoma and Laine have not properly modeled human memory, and with a more competent computer simulation it is clear that proximity or location is the most salient feature in remembering chess patterns.
New! ISSUE 8. Is Imagination Inflation Imaginary?
New! YES: Kathy Pezdek and Rebecca M. Eddy, from “Imagination Inflation: A Statistical Artifact of Regression Toward the Mean,” Memory & Cognition (2001)
New! NO: Maryanne Garry, Stefanie Sharman, Kimberley A. Wade, Maree J. Hunt, and Peter J. Smith, from “Imagination Inflation Is a Fact, Not an Artifact: A Reply to Pezdek and Eddy,” Memory & Cognition (2001)
Professors of psychology Kathy Pezdek and Rebecca Eddy demonstrate through analysis and replication of a primary investigation that false memories are not being planted through imagination, but rather the researchers have been fooled by the statistical principle of regression toward the mean. Researchers and lecturers Maryanne Garry, Stefanie Sharman, Kimberley Wade, Maree Hunt, and Peter Smith argue that Pezdek and Eddy have performed inappropriate statistical analyses, and the proper treatment of the data further demonstrates the phenomenon of imagination inflation.
New! ISSUE 9. Is Adult Memory for Childhood Abuse Unreliable?
New! YES: Peter A. Ornstein, Stephen J. Ceci, and Elizabeth F. Loftus, from “Adult Recollections of Childhood Abuse: Cognitive and Developmental Perspectives,” Psychology, Public Policy, and Law (1998)
New! NO: Judith L. Alpert, Laura S. Brown, and Christine A. Courtois, from “Comment on Ornstein, Ceci, and Loftus (1998): Adult Recollections of Childhood Abuse,” Psychology, Public Policy, and Law (1998)
Professors of psychology and law Peter Ornstein, Stephen Ceci, and Elizabeth Loftus question the accuracy of adult memories for child abuse by explaining the many delicate and malleable features of human memory that can create false memories. Law professor Judith Alpert and clinical psychologists Laura Brown and Christine Courtois respond by challenging the memory researchers’ understanding of trauma research and psychotherapy, and by accusing them of undermining the healing process of abuse victims. PART 4. Language
New! ISSUE 10. Is Context Stronger Than Frequency?
New! YES: Charles Martin, Hoang Vu, George Kellas, and Kimberly Metcalf, from “Strength of Discourse Context as a Determinant of the Subordinate Bias Effect,” The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology (1999)
New! NO: Keith Rayner, Katherine S. Binder, and Susan A. Duffy, from “Contextual Strength and the Subordinate Bias Effect: Comment on Martin, Vu, Kellas, and Metcalf,” The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology (1999)
Psychology professors Charles Martin, Hoang Vu, George Kellas, and Kimberly Metcalf demonstrate that human memory retrieval is influenced most by context when selectively searching for the meaning of ambiguous words. Cognitive researchers Keith Rayner, Katherine Binder, and Susan Duffy argue that when appropriate stimuli are used, research results indicate that memory retrieval is influenced most by the order in which possible meanings are retrieved when trying to find the intended meaning of ambiguous words.
New! ISSUE 11. Is Stuttering Isolated from Lexical Retrieval?
New! YES: Ann Packman, Mark Onslow, Tanya Coombes, and Angela Goodwin, from “Stuttering and Lexical Retrieval,” Clinical Linguistics & Phonetics (2001)
New! NO: James Au-Yeung and Peter Howell, from “Non-Word Reading, Lexical Retrieval and Stuttering: Comments on Packman, Onslow, Coombes and Goodwin,” Clinical Linguistics & Phonetics (2002)
Senior researchers Ann Packman and Mark Onslow, along with their research assistants Tanya Coombes and Angela Goodwin, demonstrate that stuttering occurs even when there is no lexical or meaningful content connected to the spoken words. Computational linguist James Au-Yeung and professor of experimental psychology Peter Howell argue that the study by Packman, et al. is so full of flaws that it explains very little about stuttering.
New! ISSUE 12. Can Computer Models Explain Language Disorders?
New! YES: William Frawley, from “Control and Cross-Domain Mental Computation: Evidence from Language Breakdown,” Computational Intelligence (2002)
New! NO: B. Chandrasekaran, from “Reach Exceeds Grasp: Comments on Frawley’s ’Control and Cross-Domain Mental Computation: Evidence from Language Breakdown,’” Computational Intelligence (2002)
Professor of linguistics and cognitive science William Frawley proposes that some language disorders are actually breakdowns in the control mechanisms of the brain, similar to the control breakdowns found in computational models. Senior research scientist B. Chandrasekaran believes Frawley has made the mistake of taking the brain-as-computer analogy as fact, and thus his conjectured arguments are of little value. PART 5. Intelligence
New! ISSUE 13. Is Emotional Intelligence Really a Form of Intelligence?
New! YES: John D. Mayer, Peter Salovey, and David Caruso, from “Models of Emotional Intelligence,” Handbook of Intelligence (2000)
New! NO: Richard D. Roberts, Moshe Zeidner, and Gerald Matthews, from “Does Emotional Intelligence Meet Traditional Standards for an Intelligence? Some New Data and Conclusions,” Emotion (2001)
Psychologists John Mayer, Peter Salovey, and David Caruso present their case that emotional intelligence is as valid as any type of intelligence based on the performance of the Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS). Researchers and lecturers Richard Roberts, Moshe Zeidner, and Gerald Matthews find the Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale to be disappointing and the whole concept of emotional intelligence to be questionable.
New! ISSUE 14. Is the Birth Order Effect on Intelligence Real?
New! YES: Joseph Lee Rodgers, H. Harrington Cleveland, Edwin van den Oord, and David C. Rowe, from “Resolving the Debate Over Birth Order, Family Size, and Intelligence,” American Psychologist (June 2000)
New! NO: R.B. Zajonc, from “The Family Dynamics of Intellectual Development,” American Psychologist (June/July 2001)
Professors of psychology Joseph Rodgers, H. Harrington Cleveland, Edwin van den Oord, and David Rowe present the case that birth order and intelligence are not related, and because of that psychologists should not claim that large families produce lower-IQ children. Psychologist and researcher R. B. Zajonc argues that family dynamics change as each new sibling is added, and this change is related to less intellectual development in children born to larger families. PART 6. Reasoning and Intuition
New! ISSUE 15. Can a Neural Network Model Account for Moral Development?
New! YES: Paul M. Churchland, from “Toward a Cognitive Neurobiology of the Moral Virtues,” The Foundations of Cognitive Science (2001)
New! NO: Darcia Narvaez and Tonia Bock, from “Moral Schemas and Tacit Judgment or How the Defining Issues Test is Supported by Cognitive Science,” Journal of Moral Education (2002)
Professor of philosophy Paul Churchland offers a cognitive science view of human moral reasoning through the development of a neural network model. Moral development researchers Darcia Narvaez and Tonia Bock rely on the cognitive science of Piaget and information processing theory to explain moral reasoning.
New! ISSUE 16. Do We Use Reasoning to Make Moral Decisions?
New! YES: James R. Rest, Darcia Narvaez, Stephen J. Thoma, and Muriel J. Bebeau, from “A Neo-Kohlbergian Approach to Morality Research,” Journal of Moral Education (2000)
New! NO: Jonathan Haidt, from “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,” Psychological Review (2001)
The research team of James Rest, Darcia Narvaez, Stephen Thoma, and Muriel Bebeau present the case that, based on over 25 years of research using the Defining Issues Test, humans move through stages of moral reasoning that guide moral decision-making processes. Psychologist Jonathan Haidt argues that the social intuitionist model, which proposes that humans have quick intuitions about moral issues that lead to reasoning for the sole purpose of justifying the previous intuitions, better explains moral cognition.
New! ISSUE 17. Is Intuition a Valid Way of Knowing?
New! YES: Helen H. I. McCutcheon and Jan Pincombe, from “Intuition: An Important Tool in the Practice of Nursing,” Journal of Advanced Nursing (2001)
New! NO: Mary Ann Rosswurm and June H. Larrabee, from “A Model for Change for Evidence-Based Practice,” Image: Journal of Nursing Scholarship (1999)
Clinical nursing researchers Helen McCutcheon and Jan Pincombe make the case that any health care decisions made by nurses that are based on intuition should be considered as rational and valid, and should be documented as part of a patient’s medical record. Professors of nursing Mary Ann Rosswurm and June Larrabee advocate for an evidence-based decision-making process for nurses that involves critical analysis of current research.
New! ISSUE 18. Should Schools Teach for Wisdom?
New! YES: Robert J. Sternberg, from “Why Schools Should Teach for Wisdom: The Balance Theory of Wisdom in Educational Settings,” Educational Psychologist (2001)
New! NO: Scott G. Paris, from “Wisdom, Snake Oil, and the Educational Marketplace,” Educational Psychologist (2001)
American Psychological Association president and author Robert J. Sternberg believes that schools need to teach wisdom-related skills rather than focus exclusively on imparting knowledge. Professor of psychology Scott G. Paris counters these suggestions by arguing that Sternberg’s description of wisdom is contradictory and his suggestions are out of touch with the political and commercial nature of education.
