Standpoint Theory, or Feminist Standpoint Theory, has generated a great deal of research, interest, and spirited controversy, so it appears to be heuristic. Yet some of the issues that scholars have raised concerning the theory warrant discussion here. We will explore two areas of critique: the charge that Standpoint Theory relies on essentialism and the complaint that it focuses on the dualisms of subjectivity and objectivity.

The complaint most commonly leveled against Standpoint Theory revolves around essentialism, and a great deal has been written on this topic. As we will discuss again in Chapter 28 with reference to Muted Group Theory, essentialism refers to the practice of generalizing about all women (or any group) as though they were essentially the same. Essentialism obscures the diversity that exists among women. The story of Angela and Latria illustrates the mistake we make if we engage in essentialism. Although they are both African American women attending the same university, the differences between them cause them to interpret the classroom discussion differently. Because Standpoint Theory focuses on the location of social groups, many researchers have argued that it is essentialist. For example, Catherine O'Leary (1997) argues that although Standpoint Theory has been helpful in reclaiming women's experiences as suitable research topics, it contains a problematic emphasis on the universality of this experience, at the expense of differences among women's experiences.

Implicit in this critique (and often explicit) are the ways that many White women researchers have excluded the standpoints and voices of women of color, women who are disabled, lesbians, poor women, and women from Third World nations (Collins, 1990). Yet this criticism may be unfair to Hartsock's conceptualization of the theory. Hartsock (1981) has stated that although there are many differences among women, she is pointing to specific aspects of women's experience that are shared by many: unpaid household labor and provision of caregiving and nurturance. Hirschmann (1997) argues that Feminist Standpoint Theory really does accommodate difference by allowing for a multiplicity of feminist standpoints. Hirschmann suggests that standpoints can be developed from Hartsock's framework that will bring a useful approach to the tension between shared identity and difference. Wood (1992) concurs with this rebuttal, and she suggests that Standpoint Theory is different from essentialist views of women in one important way: The theory does not suggest that men and women are fundamentally different (or have different essences); rather, ST begins with the assumption that social and cultural conditions that typically surround women's lives produce different experiences and understandings from the social and cultural conditions typically surrounding men's lives. Wood concludes, "There is nothing in the logic of standpoint epistemology that precludes analysis of the intersections among conditions that structure race, class, and gender relations in any given culture" (p. 14). Thus, Angela and Latria's conversation could be understood as a constellation of standpoints—some of which shape their experiences in a similar fashion and some of which cause them to diverge significantly.

Further, some more current research conducted under the ST framework has made the tension between difference and commonality central to its focus. For example, Katrina Bell, Mark Orbe, Darlene Drummond, and Sakile Camara (2000) used Black Feminist Standpoint Theory to examine African American women's communication practices. Bell and her colleagues purposely collected information from very diverse women in an effort to capture different lived experiences. This resulted in a sample of women who shared a racial identity but differed in terms of many of their other social locations including age, religion, sexual orientation, professional and economic status, and so forth.

The researchers found that despite their diversity, the participants in their study did share a multiple consciousness of oppression as a result of racism, sexism, classism, and heterosexism. Yet the participants also voiced ways in which the issue of diversity existed among African American women. Throughout their data, the participants described other aspects of their identity that became salient in their interactions with others and in many instances impeded their sense of connection with African American women. As such, the researchers saw multiple consciousness as a "dynamic process of constant negotiation" (p. 50). Thus, the researchers conclude that Black Feminist Standpoint Theory allows for the assumption of commonality of oppression while acknowledging various expressions of this common experience.

In a study of academic women, Debbie Dougherty and Kathleen Krone (2000) also sought to apply ST to a group of diverse women to capitalize on the creative tensions between similarity and difference. They interviewed four women in the same department in an academic institution and from the interviews they created a narrative that, although fictional, attempted to capture the standpoints voiced in the interviews. Then they had the participants comment on the narrative and identify areas for change and develop action plans. In this process, the researchers found both commonality and difference among the standpoints of the participants.

The women agreed that their standpoints were shaped by a sense of isolation, a strong desire for community, and the feeling of invisibility. Yet they differed in their consciousness of their own oppression. However, rather than ignoring these differences or using them to divide themselves from one another, the women used differences to strengthen their relationship. The researchers note that the critique focused on essentialism may miss the point. Dougherty and Krone observe that "differences and similarities create and recreate each other, becoming so intertwined that they are difficult to separate" (p. 26).

A second area of criticism concerns the notion of dualisms, or dualistic thinking. Feminists (Cirksena & Cuklanz, 1992) note that much of Western thought is organized around a set of oppositions, or dualisms. Reason and emotion, public and private, nature and culture, and subject and object are just a few of the pairs of opposites that are common organizing principles in Western thinking. Feminists have been concerned with these dualisms for two related reasons. First, dualisms usually imply a hierarchical relationship between the terms, elevating one and devaluing the other. When we suggest that decisions should be made rationally, not emotionally, for example, we are showing that reason holds a higher value in our culture than does emotion. Related to this issue is the concern that these dualisms often become gendered in our culture. In this process, men are associated with one extreme and women with the other. In the case of reason and emotion, women are identified with emotion. Because our culture values emotion less than reason, women suffer from this association. Feminist critics are usually concerned with the fact that dualisms force false dichotomies onto women and men, failing to see that life is less either/or than both/and, as Relational Dialectics Theory (Chapter 12) holds.

O'Leary (1997) argues that Standpoint Theory does not present us with a sufficiently complex understanding of experience, and as a result, it still rests on a dualism between subjective experience and objective truth. O'Leary suggests that Hartsock's framework cannot accommodate the complexities of multiple knowledges. Yet, Hartsock specifically allows for this very thing within her original theory, arguing for clusters of standpoints. Overall, as Hartsock (1997) notes, the controversies engendered by Standpoint Theory indicate a "fertile terrain" for debate and open the possibilities for expanding and refining the theory so that it is more responsive to diversity and clearer about the distinctions between subjectivity and objectivity.

In sum, Standpoint Theory presents us with another way of viewing the relative positions, experiences, and communication of various social groups. It has a clear political, critical bent, and it locates the place of power in social life. It has generated much controversy as people find it either offensive or compatible with their own views of social life. Certainly, ST is heuristic and provocative. The theory may be compatible with other theories, enabling us to combine them to get richer explanations for human communication behaviors. For example, ST may need support from a version of Dialectics Theory to explain the tension between commonality of social groups and uniqueness of individuals within the groups. Scholars need to continue refining Standpoint Theory, applying it to other co-cultural groups and resolving some of the issues of essentialism and dualism that critics have uncovered. Yet, Standpoint Theory holds much promise for illuminating differences in the communication behaviors of different social groups. It remains to be seen whether ST will generate findings that help us to understand our world and our communication behaviors.