Coordinated Management of Meaning is one of the few theories to explicitly place communication as a cornerstone in its foundation. Because communication is central to the theory, many scholars have employed the theory in their writings. To this end, CMM is a heuristic effort. Researchers have incorporated the theory and its tenets to understand conflict (Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997), cultural communities (Narula & Pearce, 1986), conversations (Pearce & Conklin, 1979), groups (Pearce & Pearce, 2000), families (Cronen, Johnson, & Lannamann, 1982; Harris, 1980; Harris, Cronen, & McNamee, 1979), organizations (Cronen, Pearce, & Snavely, 1979), and public address (Branham & Pearce, 1985). In addition, the theory is broad in scope, in that it covers both the intrapersonal and interpersonal processes. Pearce and Cronen attempt to understand what takes place in the minds of communicators and how they manage meaning. Although some writers have criticized the theory because communication does not explicitly frame the CMM studies (Philipsen, 1995), the theory nonetheless consistently incorporates communication action. In terms of CMM's usefulness, the theorists claim that the theory is practical (Cronen, 1995). Considering that it tries to understand everyday conversations, we believe that the theory passes the test of utility.

Despite these strengths, CMM has been criticized by communication scholars. David Brenders (1987), for example, takes issue with Pearce and Cronen's belief that individuals introduce unique language systems into their conversations with others; for CMM theorists, meaning is an intrapersonal experience. Brenders disagrees. He argues that "we do share a language which is not our idiosyncratic production, but a medium of shared symbolic meanings" (1987, p. 342). For Brenders and others, the examples that Pearce and his associates use consistently underscore the fact that the rules inherent in a conversation may differ from one person to another. This is too broad a claim, says Brenders, and in fact "leaves unexplained the social nature of meaning" (1987, p. 342). The theory's validity, therefore, is suspect if one believes this claim.

Pearce and Cronen have attempted to respond to their critics over the years. First, they believe that many critics forget that they were trained within the empiricist tradition, something we explained in detail in Chapter 4. Therefore, their earlier discussions of the theory were rooted in this heritage. Pearce (1995) candidly admits that during "'the first phase of the CMM project,' [our writings] were confused because we used the language of interpretive social science. . . . Only as we continued to refine our thinking did we discover . . . that we could not say what we were doing in the language of . . . social science" (pp. 109, 110). Therefore, critics should interpret the theory within the spirit of change; even theorists change as they clarify the goals of their theory. Further, Cronen (1995) admits some early problems with the conceptualization of their theory by indicating that the way that he and Pearce discussed the creation of meaning was originally confusing and "wrong-headed." The theorists believe, however, that what they have produced is an ethical undertaking and do not believe that their theory should be discarded because of some past misjudgments. Pearce and Cronen, then, believe that those who levy indictments against their theory should understand the time period in which the theory was developed.

CMM proponents have responded to additional criticisms. For instance, some (Cronen, Pearce, & Changshen, 1989/1990) argue that critics such as Brenders fail to recognize that their interpretation of meaning is based on a view of communication not shared by their theoretical ancestors. Therefore, to suggest that meaning cannot be co-constructed and to claim that a "deficient notion of meaning" (Brenders, 1987, p. 341) exists within CMM is limiting and uninformed. Pearce and Karen Foss (1990) further believe that messages derive their meanings from a co-construction of the social interaction, not simply the meaning one brings into an interaction. Therefore, although Brenders's critique is aimed at the way Pearce and others interpret meaning, Pearce believes that CMM should not be reduced to a simplified view of what meaning is and is not.

The struggle to understand the dynamic interplay of intrapersonal and interpersonal communication will continue. Thanks in large part to CMM, we have a deeper understanding of how individuals co-create their meaning. Further, the theory has aided us in understanding the importance of rules in social situations. Critics may continue their critique of the theory, but few can deny that CMM positioned communication at the core of human experience. That makes Coordinated Management of Meaning one of the few communication theories that is "firmly in the world it describes" (Anderson, 1996, p. 209).