Taiwan: To Be or Not to Be

"To be or not to be, that is the question," Prince Hamlet muses in one of Shakespeare's oft-quoted lines. It is a self-query that President Chen Shui-bian and the other citizens of Taiwan might ask themselves.

Taiwan (also called Formosa) is located 100 miles to the east of south-central China, has a total land area of 13,969 square miles (about the size of Maryland and Delaware combined), and a current population of 21.7 million. The island was part of China until it was seized by Japan in 1895. China regained the island after World War II, but Taiwan again became politically separated when the Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan in 1949 after being ousted by the communist forces of Mao Zedong. Both Mao's government and Chiang's government agreed that there was only one China and that Taiwan was an integral part of China. The two disagreed about which government legitimately represented China. For years, the United States and most other countries recognized Taiwan (Nationalist China, the Republic of China) as the legitimate government of all China, and Taiwan held the China seat in the United Nations.

Over time, though, most countries shifted their diplomatic recognition to Beijing. The UN seated Beijing's representative and, in effect, expelled Taiwan's in 1972; Washington shifted its recognition to the mainland in 1978. Still, Taiwan has continued to exist independently, even though, in essence, it had become a vague diplomatic entity.

For about two decades after the shifts in the 1970s, the issue of Taiwan's status remained relatively moot. More recently, though, two factors have heightened tensions as Taiwan flirts with seeking recognition as a sovereign, separate state and China threatens war, if necessary, to stop any such move. One factor is the growing confidence of Taiwan. It has prospered. Taiwan's $261 billion GDP makes it the world's nineteenth largest economy; its combined merchandise exports and imports of $236 billion make it the world's eighth largest trader. Taiwan also has a formidable military, spending some $7.5 billion a year on its more than 400,000 troops and impressive array of armaments. "The realities are that Taiwan is large, does exist, and is a force to be reckoned with in economic terms," an Asian diplomat has commented. "Now they feel they should be given some international space. It is an emotional, psychological thing. They feel inferior. They feel they are being treated as pariahs."¹

The passage of time has also changed attitudes in Taiwan. The country has two ethnic groups: the traditional Taiwanese, who make up 85 percent of the population, and the closely related mainland Chinese, many of whom arrived in 1949 and who, thereafter, dominated politics. Among the Chinese, the old guard from the mainland has given way to Chinese born on Taiwan. Their attachment to the mainland is less pronounced than that of their elders. Also, the ethnic Taiwanese have become more prominent politically. In 1988, Lee Teng-hui became the first president of Taiwan of ethnic Taiwanese heritage. Lee, however, was the leader of the Nationalist Party, which is the party established by those who had fled China in 1949. In yet another step away from China, the Nationalists lost the power they had held for over a half century. In the presidential election held in March 2000, the Nationalist candidate finished a distant third in a three-way race. The victor was Democratic progressive Party candidate Chen Shui-bian. Like his predecessor, Chen is Taiwanese. But signaling Taiwan's continued political drift away from the mainland, Chen, who was born in 1951, is the first president of the postseparation generation: those who have lived neither in China itself nor in Taiwan during a period when it was united with the mainland.

Over the past decade or so, there are numerous signs that Taiwan is cautiously seeking legal independence. President Lee's statements often seemed to favor that end. He sought to promote Taiwan's membership in the United Nations, and took a number of other actions to try to enhance Taiwan's image of independence. Lee particularly outraged Beijing in 1999 when he asserted Taiwan's de facto independence by declaring that he favored "state-to-state" relations with China and that "under such special nation-to-nation relations, there is no longer any need to declare Taiwanese independence."² Lee was regularly condemned by Beijing, but he seemed relatively palatable compared to the prospect in 2000 that Chen, the candidate of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, would be elected.

Any move toward independence is anathema to Beijing. China has repeatedly vowed to use force to reincorporate Taiwan if the island declares its independence. This stand and candidate Lee's leanings toward independence sparked a crisis in the months preceding Taiwan's March 1996 presidential election. In an attempt to intimidate Taiwan, China conducted large military maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait that included firing missiles into "test areas" near Taiwan's main ports. A foreign ministry official told the press, "There is no flexibility on this issue," and that if Taiwan opted for independence, "I am afraid there is going to be war, because this is how our policy dictates we must respond."³ In the end, China's fear campaign failed. The United States sent two aircraft carrier-led flotillas to the area. Washington warned Beijing not to be rash and simultaneously cautioned Taipei not to be provocative. The election proceeded peacefully.

Tension soared again as the 2000 election approached. In February, the mainland government released a report entitled "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue" that, for the first time, implied that China would not wait forever for reunification. If Taiwan refuses "indefinitely" to "reuinfication through negotiation," the report warned, "then the Chinese government will be forced to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force, to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity."⁴ Further raising the hear, the military, in an editorial in the Liberation Army Daily, pledged to "spare no effort in a blood-soaked battle" to protect China's territorial integrity if Taiwan formally declared independence.⁵

Such threats brought a series of counterwarnings from Washington officials. Undersecretary of State William B. Slocombe, for example, cautioned China that it faced "incalculable consequences" if it took military action. What ensued was a complex three sided, Beijing-Taipei-Washington, negotiation involving China's trade relations with the United States; China's desire to have the United States support its admission into the World Trade Organization; China's objection to the proposed U.S. sale to Taiwan of certain weapons systems (especially Arleigh Burke class warships); the United States assuring China and warning Taiwan that it did not support an independence move; the willingness of candidate, then newly elected president, Chen, to back away from his earlier pro-independence statements and at least rhetorically adhere to the principle of One-China and peaceful negotiations on reunification; and Taiwan undercutting the efforts of Republicans in the U.S. Congress to give it greater military support than the Clinton administration was willing to offer. Unlike what occurred in 1996, there were no overt demonstrations or counterdemonstrations of Chinese and American military muscle. This diplomacy will be covered in detail in Chapter 10 on that subject.

Thus, the waters in the Taiwan Strait calmed in the weeks after the election of President Chen, but the issue is far from resolved and remains potentially dangerous. Taiwan remains an "other," neither a state nor a dependent territory. China's determination to regain all its lost territories remains unfulfilled. The reversion to China's control of Hong Kong in 1997 and of Macau in 1999 leaves Taiwan as the last remaining unreclaimed territory. Now, as Foreign Ministry spokesman Chen Jian has said, "the settlement of the motherland" are "on the top of the agends."⁶

Notes

1. New York Times, June 26, 1994, p. A8.

2. New York Times, July 14, 1999.

3. New York Times, August 23, 1995, p. A12.

4. New York Times, February 22, 2000.

5. New York Times, March 6, 2000.

6. New York Times, January 31, 1996, p. A2